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CASENOTES

LABOR LAW-Congress Intended to Exclude from the Protection of the National Labor Relations Act All Employees
Properly Classified as "Managerial," Not Just Those in Positions Susceptible to Conflicts of Interest in Labor Relations
-NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Division of Textron, Inc., 94
S. Ct. 1757 (1974).
Historically the NLRB has espoused a complex and somewhat inconsistent
formula when attempting to define and classify managerial employees. 1 No
longer content with this approach, the Board is now seeking to promulgate
a simplified standard which would effectively liberalize and apparently
streamline the parameters within which persons who are closely allied with
management will be categorized. 2 The Board's latest attempt at reform,
however, was clearly checked in NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., Division of

Textron, Inc.,3 where the Supreme Court sustained not only what it viewed
as the NLRB's earlier approach to the classification of managerial employees,
but also upheld the Board's discretionary authority to apply either a rulemaking or adjudicatory procedure to the case before it. 4
1. Initially the Board classified a managerial employee on the basis of whether or
not "the interests of these employees are more closely identified with those of management." Denver Dry Goods, 74 N.L.R.B. 1167, 1175 (1947). It later added an alternative criterion when it defined managerial employees as "executives who formulate and
effectuate management policies by expressing and making operative the decisions of their
employer ....
".Palace Laundry Dry Cleaning Corp., 75 N.L.R.B. 320, 323 n.4
(1947).
2. See Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 196 N.L.R.B. 827, 828 (1972).
The Board held that only those managerial employees associated with the "formulation
and implementation" of labor relations policies were to be excluded from the National
Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-68 (1970).
3. 94 S.Ct. 1757 (1974).
4. Id. at 1770-72. In so doing, the Court upheld the appellate court's ruling that
all "true managerial employees" were excluded from the NLRA, Bell Aerospace Co.,
Div. of Textron, Inc. v. NLRB, 475 F.2d 485 (2d Cir. 1973), but rejected the conclusion that the Board erred when it applied its adjudicatory rather than its rulemaking authority. Id. at 495.
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On July 30, 1970, the United Auto Workers filed a representation petition
with the Board. The petition sought certification as ,the bargaining representative of -the twenty-five buyers in the purchasing and procurement department of the Bell Aerospace Co. plant located in Wheatfield, New York. The
company opposed the petition on the ground that the buyers were managerial
employees and were thus excluded from coverage under the National Labor
Relations Act.
On May 20, 1971, the NLRB held that the buyers constituted an appropriate unit for purposes of collective bargaining and directing elections.5 In
so doing the Board stated that the buyers were covered by the Act even
though they might be classified as managerial. 6 On that same day, however,
the Eighth Circuit denied enforcement of a similar Board order in NLRB v.
North Arkansas Electric Cooperative, Inc.7 Encouraged by this development
8
the Company moved the Board for reconsideration. In denying the motion
the NLRB stated that only those managerial employees associated with -the
"formulation or implementation" of labor relations policies were to be excluded from the Act.9 In review of each case the "fundamental touchstone"
was to be whether the activities of the managerial employees did or did not
include determinations which would involve any conflict of interest if such
persons maintained membership in a union. 10 Dissatisfied with the NLRB's
ruling, the company appealed to 'the Second Circuit for review. The Board,
in turn, cross-petitioned for enforcement.
The court of appeals denied enforcement, concluding that Congress intended to exempt all true managerial employees from the Act's protection."
Moreover, the court ruled that although the Board was not prohibited from
determining that "buyers or some types of buyers" are not true managerial
employees, it could do so only in a rulemaking, and not in an adjudicatory
proceeding.'2 On certiorari the Supreme Court upheld the Second Circuit's
5. Bell Aerospace Co., Div. of Textron, Inc., 190 N.L.R.B. 431 (1971).
6. Id. at 432.
7. 446 F.2d 602 (8th Cir. 1971). The court ruled that managerial employees were
not covered nor protected by the Act.
8. 196 N.L.R.B. at 827.
9. See note 2 supra.
10. 196 N.L.R.B. at 828.
11. 475 F.2d at 494.
12. Id. at 495. Section 6 of the NLRA empowers the Board to make rules and regulations to effectuate the policies of the Act. 29 U.S.C. § 156 (1970). The procedural
requirements for rulemaking require the Board to publish a general notice of the proposed rules in the Federal Register, setting out the time and place of the proceedings,
and specifying the portion of the Act under which the rule was proposed and the terms
or substance of the contemplated rule. Administrative Procedure Act of 1946, 5 U.S.C.

§ 553 (1970).
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ruling on the managerial employee question,"8 but decided that the NLRB
is not precluded from promulgating new policies in an adjudicatory proceeding. 14 Justice White dissented in part, 15 arguing in support of the Board's
decision and declaring that Congress never intended to exclude managerial
employees from the Act.
In Teadhing its conclusion the Court focused on two issues: first, whether
all "managerial employees," rather than just those in positions susceptible to
conflicts of interest in labor relations, are exempt from the protections of the
Act; and secondly, whether the Board must invoke its rulemaking procedures1 6 if it determines that buyers are not managerial employees under the
Act. This Note will discuss the question of whether or not managerial personnel are protected by the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act.

I.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT

Prior to 1947, the Board had never excluded managerial employees from
the protection of the NLRA, but only from bargaining units of rank and file
personnel.' 7 The Board's position with respect to supervisors,' 8 however,
vascillated during this time.

In Maryland Drydock Co.") the NLRB found

The Board's adjudicative function is derived from section 10 of the NLRA which empowers the Board to "prevent any persons from engaging in unfair labor practice . . . affecting commerce," and outlines the procedures by which the Board may issue an appropriate order based upon its independent opinion. 29 U.S.C. § 160 (1970).
13. 94 S. Ct. at 1769.
14. Id. at 1771.
15. Justice Brennan, Justice Stewart and Justice Marshall joined in the dissent.
16. For a general discussion pertaining to the NLRB's authority to apply an adjudicatory or rulemaking procedure to the case before it, see Bernstein, The NLRB's Adjudication-Rule Making Dilemma Under the Administrative Procedure Act, 79 YALE L.J. 571
(1970); Peck, The Atrophied Rule-Making Powers of the National Labor Relations
Board, 70 YALE L.J. 729 (1961); Comment, A ludicial Demand for Utilization of Substantive Rule Making by the NLRB: Wyman-Gordon Co. v. NLRB, 15 WAYNE L. REV.
763 (1969); Comment, Rule-Making and Adjudication in Administrative Policy Making:
NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon Co., 11 B.C. IND. & COMM. L. REV. 64 (1969); Note, Ad-

ministrative Law Making Through Adjudication: The National Labor Relations Board,
45 MINN. L. REV. 609 (1961).
17. In one decision where it excluded buyers and expediters from a unit of office and
clerical employees the Board stated: "This is not to say, however, that buyers and expediters are to be denied the right to self-organization and to collective bargaining under
the Act." Dravo Corp., 54 N.L.R.B. 1174, 1177 (1944). See also Vulcan Corp., 58
N.L.R.B. 733 (1944); Hudson Motor Car Co., 55 N.L.R.B. 509 (1944).
18. Supervisory employees are expressly excluded from protection of the NLRA. The
term is defined in section 2(11) as those persons who have the authority to "hire, transfer, suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward or discipline other employees," when such authority is "not of a merely routine or clerical nature but requires
the use of independent judgment." 29 U.S.C. § 152(11) (1970).
19. 49 N.L.R.B. 733 (1943).
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that a separate unit of supervisory personnel would not constitute an appropriate bargaining unit. Maryland Drydock was subsequently overruled in
PackardMotor Car Co., 20 where the Board's decision that foremen were "employees" having the right to form their own unit was upheld 'by the Supreme
Court. 21 Fearful that the Packard decision would only add to the already
burgeoning growth of union membership, 22 and freshly aware of the crippling
effects of industry-wide strikes, 23 Congress amended the NLRA in 1946 by
24
enacting the Taft-Hartley Act.
The amendments attempted to limit the growth of union membership by
narrowing the definitional scope of the term employee as defined in the Act. 25
To achieve this objective both the House and Senate expressly agreed to
exempt all supervisors from the protection of the NLRA. The House Conference Committee Report 26 specified that in addition to those persons working in labor relations, personnel and employment departments, confidential
employees 27 were also ,to be excluded from the protection of the Act. Explicit in the report was the view that since exemption of these persons was the
prevailing Board practice, it was not the intention of the conferees to alter
this practice in any respect.
Following enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments, 'the Board continued to hold that managerial personnel were to be excluded from bargaining
units of other employees. 28 Not until Swift & Co. 29 did the Board rule that
it was the clear intent of Congress to exclude from the NLRA "all individuals
allied with management." 0 From the time of the decision in Swift, until the
20. 61 N.L.R.B. 4 (1945).
21. Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S. 485 (1947).
22. See 26 VAND. L. REV. 850, 851-52 (1973). The author noted that union membership during the years 1935 to 1947 grew from 3 million to 15 million workers.
23. See Reilly, The Legislative History of the Taft-Hartley Act, 29 GEo. WASH. L.
REv. 285, 288-89 (1960).
24. Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
25. Section 2(3) of the NLRA defines employee as "any employee" with the express
exceptions of "any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic

service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent or
spouse, or . . . an independent contractor, or . . . supervisors .... ." 29 U.S.C. § 152
(3) (1970).
26. H.R. CoN. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 35-36 (1947).
27. Confidential employees have been classified as those who "assist and act in a confidential capacity to persons who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations." Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. NLRB, 398 F.2d 669,
670 (6th Cir. 1968).
28. See Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 8 (1950); Wise, Smith & Co., 83
N.L.R.B. 1019 (1949); Denton's, Inc., 83 N.L.R.B. 35 (1949).
29. 115 N.L.R.B. 752 (1956).
30. Id. at 753-54.
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NLRB's unsuccessful attempt at reversing the Swift doctrine in North Arkansas Electric Cooperative,31 the cases dealing with managerial employees had
failed to clarify the Board's position. 32 Thus, Bell Aerospace and North Arkansas appear to represent an effort by the Board to clear up -the confusion
created by the NLRB's decision in Swift and to establish criteria by which
the Board may classify managerial personnel.
II.

THE COURT INTERPRETS THE TAFT-HARTLEY ACT

In reaching its decision in Bell Aerospace, the Court examined the Board's
rulings prior to enactment of the Taft-Hartley amendments, the legislative
history of the amendments themselves and the NLRB's subsequent pronouncements. At the outset, Justice Powell reasoned that since the Board
had explicitly excluded managerial personnel only from rank and file units,
uncertainty prevailed as to whether the NLRB regarded all "managerial employees" as entirely outside of the protection of the Act. 38 Justice White in
34
his dissent, however, focused on the decision in Dravo Corporation,
which
categorically denied that managerial employees were to be excluded from the
Act's protection.3 5 Unimpressed by the Dravo rule, the majority sought clarification in the legislative history of the Labor-Management Relations Act.
The Court stressed the dissent of Justice Douglas in Packard Motor Car
Co. v. NLRB, 36 which chastised the Board for "obliterating" the line between
management and labor and for paving the way for unionization of vice-presidents, managers and superintendents.3 7 In Bell Aerospace, the Court perceived congressional reversal of Packard as an attempt to enact the spirit of
31. 185 N.L.R.B. at 827. The Board ruled that managerial employees were entitled
to be represented under the Act unless there is some "cogent reason" for denying such
representation.
32. None of the cases following Swift have asserted a clear and definitive exclusion
of managerial employees from the Act. See, e.g., Eastern Camera & Photo Corp., 140
N.L.R.B. 569, 572 (1963); Kearney & Trecker Corp., 121 N.L.R.B. 817, 822 (1958);
Diana Shop, 118 N.L.R.B. 743, 745 (1957).
There have been instances, however, where the Board has cited Swift as authority for
exclusion of managerial personnel from bargaining units of other employees. See AFLCIO, 120 N.L.R.B. 969, 971 n.6 (1958); Capeland Refrigeration Corp., 118 N.L.R.B.
1364, 1365 n.2 (1957).
33. 94 S. Ct. at 1763.
34. 54 N.L.R.B. 1174 (1944).
Interestingly enough, Justice Powell employed the
same case, but for the proposition that at this time the Board remained uncertain as to
whether all buyers and expediters were to be considered managerial employees. See 94

S. Ct.
35.
36.
37.

at 1763.
94 S. Ct. at 1774 (White, J., dissenting).
330 U.S. at 493 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
Id. at 494-95 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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Justice Douglas' words into law.3s
It should be noted, however, that the
Packard dissent never advocated the exemption of all managerial personnel
from the protection of the NLRB but only those persons who acted for management not only in formulating but also in executing its labor policies.3 9
Specifically, the majority emphasized that although the statutory language
adopted in the 1947 amendments did not expressly exclude confidential employees or persons working in labor relations, personnel or employment departments, they were implicitly exempted from the Act's protection. 40 Proceeding upon this supposition, the Court then assumed that managerial person-nel were "paramount among this impliedly excluded group."'41 While the
majority is accurate in its assertion that labor relations and confidential employees are exempted from the protection of the Act, the contention that
managerial personnel are also excluded is difficult to reconcile with legislative
history for two reasons. First, any explicit legislative directive to exempt persons closely allied with management is conspicuously lacking; and secondly,
if "the absence of any express treatment" of managerial employees was intended to codify prior Board practice then managerial employees would be
42
protected by the Act.

III.

THE COURT'S RELIANCE ON Swift & Co.

Equally problematic is the majority's declaration that immediately following passage of the Taft-Hartley Act, the NLRB adhered to the view that
managerial personnel were excluded from the protection of NLRA. 43 In
truth, the Board continued to hold that persons with managerial interests
were precluded from joining bargaining units of other employees. 44 However, not until American Locomotive Co. 45 did the Board reject the inclusion
of managerial employees in a unit of rank and file personnel or their placement in a separate unit. Although the majority's reference to American Locomotive 46 exposed what appeared to be the Board's difficulty in classifying
managerial employees, it was not nearly as damaging as the Court's reliance
on the Swift doctrine. The Court utilized the precedential force of Swift to
38. 94 S. Ct. at 1763-64.
39. 330 U.S. at 496 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
40. 94 S. Ct. at 1766.
41. Id. at 1767.
42. Id. at 1777 (White, J., dissenting).
43. Id. at 1767.
44. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 89 N.L.R.B. 8 (1950) (buyers excluded from
maintenance and production units); Denton's, Inc., 83 N.L.R.B. 35 (1949) (excluded
buyers and assistant buyers from a unit of clerical employees).
45. 92 N.L.R.B. 115 (1950).
46. 94 S. Ct. at 1768.
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sustain what it perceived to be congressional intent. While the majority unconvincingly suggested 47 that Congress intended to incorporate Swift into the
1959 amendments to the NLRA, 48 the dissenting justices were emphatic in
their assertion that the same amendments dealt not with the managerial employee dilemma but rather with the problems arising out of secondary boy49
cotts and picketing.
Nor did the dissent accept the Court's assumption that Congress' silent reaction to Swift necessarily implied legislative approval of all Board rulings
previously made. 50 If the majority must resort ,to congressional silence in order to substantiate its position, it betrays a significant weakness in its argument. 51 In its most favorable light, legislative silence has been viewed as
congressional approval of the Board's statutorily prescribed use of discretion. 52 Accordingly, the Board should be allowed to utilize this discretion
in establishing the correct limits of a bargaining unit, and should not be subject to reversal unless it is "arbitrary and capricious in the exercise of its discretion."' 8
It is fundamental to the exercise of agency discretion that decisions be

based upon the experience of appointed officials who have an adequate understanding of the "complexities of the subject which is entrusted to their administration.15 4 Everyday experience in the administration of the NLRA
gives the Board familiarity with the circumstances and background of employment relationships, and this experience "must be brought frequently to
bear" on the question of who is an employer under the NLRA.5 5 In Bell
Aerospace, however, the Court has failed to defer to the competence and ex47. Id.
48. Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
49. 94 S. Ct. at 1779 (White, J.,
dissenting).
50. Id. The dissent was responding to a charge made by the Court that the Board,
since its inception, has consistently held managerial employees to be outside the purview
of the Act. 94 S. Ct. at 1768.
51. On two occasions the Supreme Court has declared that "it is at best treacherous

to find in Congressional silence alone the adoption of a controlling rule of law." See
Boys Markets, Inc v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235, 241 (1970); Girouard v.
United States, 328 U.S. 61, 69 (1946).
52. In NLRB v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U.S. 344 (1953), the Supreme Court held that
although the language of the NLRA pertaining to back-pay awards was reenacted while
the Board adhered to a particular formula, the legislation did not compel the conclusion
that Congress intended to freeze administrative decisions. Reenactment was merely an
indication that the Board's prior practice was authorized and not a withdrawal of discretionary power to fashion remedies.
53. Illinois State Journal-Register, Inc. v. NLRB, 412 F.2d 37, 40 (7th Cir. 1969).
54. Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U.S. 793, 800 (1945). See International
Union of Elec., Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961).

55. NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).

Casenotes

1974]

pertise of the Board 56 and, as a consequence, has denied the NLRB the opportunity of reassessing its own prior decisions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Whether or not the standard adopted in Bell Aerospace adequately complies with the spirit of Taft-Hartley is an issue which the Court has left unresolved. Instead, the Court has chosen to create what appears to be an insurmountable barrier to managerial employees who seek protection under the
NLRA. Although the majority has formulated an intricate rationalization
in order to justify its conclusion, neither the legislative history of Taft-Hartley nor the NLRB's decisions preceding enactment of the LMRA57 support
the Court's decision. Moreover, despite the Court's support of the Swift doctrine, it is arguable that the leading role given to the Board, in what Congress
intended to be the orderly formulation of sound national labor policy, makes
the Board an appropriate forum in which to resolve the redefinition of managerial employees.
It is incumbent upon the Board that it reappraise old standards and definitions as they relate to labor policy formulation. The Board may perceive
a change in attitudes between employers and lower level management 5 s and
a concomitant deterioration of the community of interest which has long been
thought to exist between an employer and a managerial employee. 59 In addition, with accelerated corporate growth and technological advancement,
there has been an intensified convergence of economic power in the hands
of high level management 60 and a growing difficulty in determining whether
or not all managerial employees take an affirmative and substantial part
in the implementation of executive policies. Thus, in light of the Board's
continuing involvement in these matters and the expertise it has developed
since its inception, it would appear that the NLRB is sufficiently competent
to determine whether or not managerial employees have become so threatened by corporate growth that statutory protection is necessary.
Nicholas A. Appugliese, Jr.
56. See, e.g., International Union of Elec., Radio and Machine Workers v. NLRB,
366 U.S. 667, 674 (1961); NLRB v. Seven-Up Co., 344 U.S. 344, 348 (1953); NLRB
v. Hearst Publications Co., Inc., 322 U.S. 111, 130 (1944).
57. See note 24 supra.
58. See Ordman, The National Labor Relations Act: A Current and Prospective View,

N.Y.U. 23D ANN. CONF. ON LABOR 3, 13 (1971). The author noted, "Inflation, rising
unemployment, growth of corporate enterprises, and mergers are the source of. . . new
and different issues-both in the representational area and in the- unfair labor practice
area. Prominent among these are unit issues, where hitherto settled lines of authority
are being re-examined ....
59. See 26 VAND. L. REV. 850, 863 (1973).
60. See Ordman, supra note 58, at 4.
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CIVIL RIGHTS-EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION-Prior
Submission of Discrimination Complaint to Arbitration under
a Collective Bargaining Agreement Does Not Foreclose Trial
of the Issue De Novo under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964. Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
Paralleling the dramatic increase in the number and variety of local, state
and federal statutory procedures designed to provide redress for discriminatory' treatment which emerged during the 1960's was an equally dramatic
increase in the proportion of collective bargaining agreements which included
broad non-discrimination clauses. 2 These agreements provide for redress of
on-the-job discrimination through binding grievance and arbitration procedures. 3 The creation of these multiple avenues for redress of grievance
brought new problems. Since the newly -available procedures varied widely
as to ,their speed, complexity, cost and extent of possible remedial action
available, 4 the question of which procedure the aggrieved should choose has
proven difficult. In addition to selecting the appropriate redress procedure,
an employee had to face the problem that the election of one procedure might
preclude the simultaneous or subsequent submission of the complaint to another forum. On the other hand, if submission of work-related grievances to
arbitration did not preclude their being raised in other administrative or judicial forums, employers were faced with the question of how many times,
in how many different proceedings, they would be required to defend themselves against charges arising from a single set of facts. In the case of Alex1. The term "discrimination" is used throughout this Note as it is defined in Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1970), as discrimination
based on race, color, religion, sex or national origin rather than in the more traditional
labor law sense of referring to preferential treatment based on the presence or absence
of union membership.
2. 62% of collective bargaining agreements contained broad nondiscrimination
clauses in 1960, but by 1971 over two-thirds (69%) of the agreements contained
such clauses. BNA, 1969 LABOR RELATIONS YEARBOOK 34; BNA, BASIC PATTERNS IN
UNION CONTRACTS (7th ed. 1971).
In 1970, 25,000,000 employees were covered by
160,000 collective bargaining agreements. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
LABOR, BULL.

No. 1750,

DIRECTORY OF NAT'L UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE ASS'NS

1971, at

87, 88 (1972).
3. 94% of all collective bargaining agreements contain provisions for binding arbitration. Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837, 844 n.21 (1971); BNA, 1970 LABOR
RELATIONS YEARBOOK 38.
4. There are at least eight different federally created remedies available to the victim of alleged on-the-job discrimination. Brief for Petitioner at 19, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). Of course, not all of these remedies are applicable in every instance. See also Hebert & Reischel, Title VH1 and the Multiple Approaches

to Eliminating Employment Discrimination,46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 449 (1971).
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ander v. Gardner-Denver Co. 5 the Supreme Court squarely faced these questions6 and clarified the relative positions of employee and employer within
the context of the dual national policy of ending discrimination on the one
hand and encouraging arbitration of labor disputes on the other.
Harrell Alexander, Sr., a black drill press trainee, was discharged by his
employer, the Gardner-Denver Company, for defective workmanship. Pursuant to the plant collective bargaining agreement, a grievance was filed
alleging termination without just cause. Prior to the completion of the grievance-arbitration procedure, he also filed a complaint -alleging discrimination
with the Colorado Civil Rights Commission, which referred it to the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The arbitrator found "just
cause" for the termination and the EEOC found "no basis" for the discrimination charge. When Alexander attempted to exercise the Title VII remedy of filing suit in federal district court, the suit was dismissed and summary
judgment granted on the employer's motion. The trial court, having found
that the collective bargaining agreement included a clause providing arbitration for alleged discrimination and that the issue had been raised in the arbitration procedure, grounded its dismissal on election of remedies, waiver
and the federal policy favoring arbitration of labor disputes. 7 The Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit affirmed. 8
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice Powell, reversed. A unanimous Court held that prior submission to arbitration of a claim under a nondiscrimination clause of a collective bargaining agreement does not foreclose
an employee's statutory right to a trial de novo under Title VII of -the Civil
Rights Act of 1964,9 since Congress intended that Title VII supplement,
rather than supplant, alternative means of redress. The Court stated further
that Congress intended the final responsibility for the enforcement of the Act
to remain with the federal courts. The opinion pointed out that an arbitral
award must be based on contractual rights, whereas Title VII confers statutory rights which cannot be prospectively waived in the collective bargaining
process. Thus, a Title VII trial is not a review of an arbitral award, but
rather a separate judicial determination of statutory rights, although the
arbitral award can be -admitted as evidence and accorded such weight as may
5. 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
6. An evenly divided Court had wrestled less successfully with the same issues three
years earlier. Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971) (per curiam).
7. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F. Supp. 1012 (D. Colo. 1971).
8. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209 (10th Cir. 1972) (per curiam).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1970).

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 24:126

be appropriate under the facts and circumstances of the individual case.
This decision set aside a series of inconsistent lower court opinions and
delineated the relative roles of employee, employer, the arbitral process and
the federal judiciary in cases of alleged discrimination in employment.
Whether it makes equally clear the role of the union as a third party in such
situations, is less certain. The same doubts may also be entertained with
regard to the relationship of this decision to the broader national policy of
arbitration as the preferred means of resolving employment disputes. 10
I.

PRIOR CONFLICTING LOWER COURT DECISIONS

Prior to the decision in Alexander, the lower court decisions mandated a
variety of inconsistent solutions to the issue of whether prior submission of a
discrimination complaint to arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement precluded redress under Title VII. At least four basic directions
emerged from the district and circuit court opinions: 1) total preclusion;
2) no preclusion, if arbitration and Title VII remedies were pursued simultaneously; 3) deferral to arbitral awards under certain circumstances; and
4) no preclusion.
The leading case for total preclusion was Dewey v. Reynolds Metals Co."
which seemed to dominate this issue after its affirmance by an equally divided Supreme Court. Nevertheless, this case was not free from ambiguity.
As .the Alexander Court pointed out, the reasoning in Dewey was initially
believed to be based in part upon the doctrine of election of remedies.1 2
Subsequently, however, the Sixth Circuit described its decision in Dewey as
resting on equitable estoppel and "themes of res judicata and collateral
'l8
estoppel.'
It is at least arguable that the Sixth Circuit subsequently qualified its decision in Dewey. Dicta in Spann v. Kaywood Div., Joanna Western Mills
Co.' 4 indicates that "pursuit of arbitration, [with] some simultaneous use of
court or agency process" means "judicial jurisdiction to later review the arbitrator's decision" is not per se precluded.15 Thus, completion of arbitral proceedings in the absence of parallel judicial proceedings (as in Dewey) pre10. See note 34 infra.
11. 429 F.2d 324 (6th Cir. 1970).

12. 415 U.S. 36, 49 n.10 (1974).
13. Newman v.Avco Corp., 451 F.2d 743, 746 n.1 (6th Cir. 1971).
14. 446 F.2d 120 (6th Cir. 1971). In Thomas v. Philip Carey Mfg. Co., 455 F.2d
911 (6th Cir. 1971), the Sixth Circuit returned to its position in Dewey and held again
that a completed arbitral process barred assertion of a Title VII claim.
15. 446 F.2d at 122.
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cludes access to judicial remedies available under Title VII, while a simultaneous undertaking along both avenues of redress does not necessarily have that
effect.
Prior to Dewey, both the Seventh and Fifth Circuits had rejected a preclusion rule.' 6 Last year, the Ninth Circuit adopted the same position in
Oubichon v. North American Rockwell Corp.17

The Fifth Circuit chose an alternative approach to the problem by defining the circumstances under which a federal court could properly defer to an
arbitral award in Rios v. Reynolds Metals Co.'s Devising a five-point standard designed to insure that the employees' rights would receive substantially
the same protections in the arbitral forum as would be available in the federal court, the court stated that these requirements must be complied with
before judicial deferral to an arbitral award would be appropriate.' 9
These inconsistent lower court rulings were reviewed in the briefs before
the Supreme Court. 20 The briefs urging affirmance requested adoption of a
clear preclusion rule or, alternatively, a liberalized standard for judicial deferral to arbitral awards. The briefs urging reversal argued for a no-preclu16. Hutchings v. United States Industries, Inc., 428 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1970) (unfavorable arbitration award does not bar later Title VII charge and suit); Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711, 715 (8th Cir. 1969) (parallel judicial and arbitral
proceedings are permissible as long as duplicate relief or unjust enrichment does not result). The Third Circuit has also held that an arbitral award does not render moot a
continuing violation of Title VII. Fekete v. U.S. Steel Corp., 424 F.2d 331 (3d Cir.
1970).
17. 482 F.2d 569 (9th Cir. 1973).
18. 467 F.2d 54 (5th Cir. 1972).
19. First, there may be no deference to the decision of the arbitrator unless the
contractual right coincides with rights under Title VII. Second, it must be plain
that the arbitrator's decision is in no way violative of the private rights guaranteed by Title VII, nor of the public policy which inheres in Title VII. In addition, before deferring, the district court must be satisfied that (1) the factual
issues before it are identical to those decided by the arbitrator; (2) the arbitrator had power under the collective agreement to decide the ultimate issue of
discrimination; (3) the evidence presented at the arbitral hearing dealt adequately with all factual issues; (4) the arbitrator actually decided the factual
issues presented to the court; (5) the arbitration proceeding was fair and regular and free of procedural infirmities. The burden of proof in establishing
these conditions of limitation will be upon the respondent as distinguished from
the claimant.
id. at 58.
20. The Brief for Petitioner, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36
(1974), and the Brief of the United States as amicus curiae urging reversal reviewed
the prior decisions in detail as did the Respondent's Brief. The briefs urging affirmance, those of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Retail Federation, focused primarily upon policy questions.
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sion rule, at least in those situations where Title VII procedures had been
initiated prior to the completion of the arbitral process.
II.

THE REASONING OF THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court's rejection of the lower courts' decisions on preclusion
and deferral was based on an fanalysis of congressional intent, the distinction
between statutory and contractual rights, the distinction between the federal
judicial and the arbitral process, and the Court's view of the relationship the
national policy against discrimination should have to the national policy favoring resolution of employment disputes through arbitration.
In its analysis of legislative intent, the Court noted that Congress indicated that the policy against discrimination was to be of -the "highest priority."' 21 The Civil Rights Act of 1964 contains "no suggestion in the statutory
scheme that a prior arbitral decision either forecloses an individual's right to
sue or divests federal courts of jurisdiction. ' 22 Moreover, under the Act,
"in general, submission of a claim to one forum does not preclude a later
submission to another. '23 Further, "the legislative history of Title VII manifests a congressional intent to allow an individual to pursue independently
his rights under both Title VII and other applicable state and federal statutes."' 24 Thus, Justice Powell found that the purposes and procedures embodied in Title VII strongly suggest no preclusion.
By stressing the contractual nature of the rights to be vindicated through
arbitration under a collective bargaining agreement as opposed to the statutory nature of rights conferred by Title VII, the Court found that "no inconsistency results from permitting both rights to be enforced in their respectively
appropriate forums."2-5 Thus, the doctrine of election of remedies, "which
refers to situations where an individual pursues remedies that are legally or
factually inconsistent, has no application in the present context."'26
Likewise, the Court asserted that arguments based on waiver are inapplicable. Whereas unions may waive certain rights related to collective activity, the rights conferred upon the individual by Title VII are absolute,
and any waiver, other than a voluntary and knowing waiver made by the in21. 415 U.S. at 47 (1974), citing Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390
U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
22. 415 U.S. at 47 (1974).
23. Id. at 47-48.
24. Id. at 48.
25. Id. at 50.
26. Id. at 49. The same reasoning leads to the rejection of arguments based on res
judicata and collateral estoppel. Id. at 49 n.10.
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dividual to the employer as a part of a voluntary settlement, would defeat
the paramount Congressional purpose underlying Title VII.2 7
The dichotomy between statutory and contractual rights was also basic to
the Court's analysis of the arbitral process, since the arbitrator's duty is to
interpret only contractual rights, "regardless whether certain contractual
rights are similar to, or duplicative of, the substantive rights secured by Title
VII. '' 2a After an extensive comparison of the arbitral and judicial processes,
the Court concluded that the same factors which make arbitration an "efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious means for dispute resolution" render it
"a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the
federal courts."'29 Scattered throughout the opinion are references to the
"final responsibility" and "plenary powers" of the federal courts for the enforcement of Title VII rights. 30
These same conclusions also led to the rejection of rigid deferral standards.
The Court was of the opinion that standards for deferral as rigorous as those
applied in Rios would excessively burden the arbitral process;3' whereas
less stringent standards for deferral, such as those proposed by Alexander's
employer, 3 2 would provide insufficient protection to the Title VII rights of
the employee.

3
3

27. "In no event can the submission to arbitration of a claim under the nondiscrimination clause of a collective-bargaining agreement constitute a binding waiver with respect to the employee's rights under Title VII." Id. at 52 n. 15.
28. Id. at 54.
29. Id. at 58. The comparison stressed procedures for fact-finding, as well as
completeness of the record produced, rules of evidence employed, discovery procedures
available, obligation to state the reason for an award and the number of arbitrators
without legal training.
30. Id. at 44-57.
31. Id. at 58-59.
32. Deferral would be granted under those standards where 1) the claim was before
the arbitrator; 2) the collective bargaining agreement prohibited the form of discrimination charged in the suit under Title VII; and 3) the arbitrator has authority to rule
on the claim and to fashion a remedy. Id. at 55-56. The proposal was derived from
the NLRB's policy of deferring to arbitral decisions on statutory issues in selected cases.
See, e.g., Spielberg Manufacturing Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 1080, 1082 (1955).
33. 415 U.S. at 56-58. However, the Court did list a group of factors to be
considered by the trial court in determining what weight could be appropriately given
to arbitral awards:
Relevant factors include the existence of provisions in the collective-bargaining
agreement that conform substantially with Title VII, the degree of procedural
fairness in the arbitral forum, adequacy of the record with respect to the issue
of discrimination, and the special competence of particular arbitrators. Where
an arbitral determination gives full consideration to an employee's Title VII
rights, a court may properly accord it great weight. This is especially true
where the issue is solely one of fact, specifically addressed by the parties and
decided by the arbitrator on the basis of an adequate record. But courts should
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Finally, the Court found unpersuasive arguments that a decision other
than preclusion or deferral would be in conflict with the national labor policy's emphasis upon arbitration as the preferred means for the resolution of
conflicts in employment. 3 4 It also rejected the notion -that such a decision
would reduce employers' willingness to include nondiscrimination clauses in
collective bargaining agreements. Proceeding from the well established concelt that arbitration is the quid pro quo for the union's undertaking a nostrike obligation, the Court found 'that both employers and employees will
continue to find the "'therapeutic" process of "fair and regular" arbitration
which "may well produce a settlement satisfactory to both employer and employee" desirable for the resolution of discrimination complaints, thus sparing
both the "expense and 'aggravation associated with a lawsuit" or a strike.8 5
III.

IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE

Under the Alexander decision, the employee need no longer make an initial choice between submission of his or her complaint to grievance-arbitration
procedures provided by a collective bargaining agreement, or pursuing the
Title VII routes of redress. 86 Nor need there be concern for initiating the
Title VII procedures prior to the receipt of an arbitral award, except for
the usual statute of fimitations considerations. Furthermore, a partial redress
of the grievance in one forum cannot foreclose pursuit of fll vindication of
those rights in another.3 7 As a consequence of the expansion of the employee's means of redress, the employer is confronted with the 'possibility of
ever be mindful that Congress, in enacting Title VII, thought it necessary to
provide a judicial forum for the ultimate resolution of discriminatory employment claims. It is the duty of courts to assure the full availability of this
forum.
Id. at 60 n.21.
34. The policy of encouraging arbitration as the preferred avenue has developed
through a series of cases, most importantly: Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,
353 U.S. 448 (1957); the Steelworkers Trilogy of United Steelworkers v. American Mfg.
Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960), United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363

U.S. 574 (1960), and United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960); Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970); and
Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974). The same basic policy underlies
Collyer Insulated Wire, 192 N.L.R.B. 837 (1971). The view of arbitration and arbitrators which underlies this policy is vigorously criticized in P. HAYs, LABOR ARBITRATION:
A DIssmsmNo VIEW (1966).

35. 415 U.S. at 55.
36. Under collective bargaining agreements such grievances must be filed promptly
or they are regarded as waived. Under art. 23, § 5 of the agreement involved here,
the time limit was five working days from the occurrence giving rise to it. Id. at 40
n.3.
37. However, subsequent awards are to be so structured as to avoid the possibility
of unjust enrichment through multiple recoveries. Id. at 51 n.14.
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being forced to defend against charges arising from 'the same set of facts under multiple sets of procedural rules and in different forums.
Far less clear is -the position of the union in cases of on-the-job discrimination. Although the -union clearly has a statutory duty not 'to discriminate
against those whom it -represents in the collective bargaining process, 38 it
seems far less clear how far its affirmative duty to assist in the redress of
employer discrimination extends. At a minimum, the union clearly has the
duty of "fair representation" of its members in the context of grievancearbitration procedures.3 9 However, as the court noted, "a breach of the
'40
union's duty may prove difficult to establish."
Now that the finality of arbitration procedures in discrimination cases
has been qualified, employers may well -become more reluctant to include
antidiscrimination clauses in collective bargaining agreements. 4' If so, the
unions will be faced with 'a difficult problem. How far should they go in
the collective bargaining process in making concessions on economic issues
designed to benefit all their members in order to secure the contractual right
to arbitrate discrimination grievances on behalf of their female and minority
members? 42 Consideration of past experience does not yield optimistic answers. It would be indeed ironic if the Alexander decision, which was designed -to secure the availability of multiple procedures for redress of grievances, should have the net effect of reducing or eliminating the availability
of the arbitral forum by making it less likely that such clauses will be included
in future collective bargaining agreements. One may also wonder whether,
in any case, -the Court's stressing the relative strengths of the judicial proc38. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(c) (1970).
39. This raises an important, but submerged, aspect of this case, because it was the
petitioner's dissatisfaction with the assistance provided by his union which caused him
first to involve his clergyman in the process and then to file his complaint with the Colorado Human Rights Commission. Appendix Brief at 12-14, Alexander v. GardnerDenver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974). See also note 44 infra.
40. 415 U.S. at 58 n.19 (1974). Certain pragmatic factors also work to make
members' charges of union discrimination or breach of the duty of fair representation
unlikely. The worker is unlikely to charge the union while the grievance-arbitration
procedure is in progress, since the union serves as his or her representative during that
process; but if the union is not included in the original EEOC charge, that charge cannot
be amended to include it at the trial stage. Bowe v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d
711 (7th Cir. 1969).
41. Briefs for the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the American Retail Federation as
amici curiae, Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
42. Women, who make up the largest group receiving Title VII protection, constitute
only 20.7% of all union membership and comprise 50% or more of the membership
in only 26 of the 185 largest unions. BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR. BULL. No. 1750, DIRECTORY OF NAT'L UNIONS AND EMPLOYEE ASS'NS 1971, at 75-

76 (1972).
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ess when contrasted with the limitations of arbitral procedure will not tend
to cause many grievants to by-pass the arbitral for the judicial forum.
Although the Court rejected the contention that its decision would be in
conflict with the national labor policy's treatment of arbitration as the preferred means of resolving employment disputes, it failed to delineate clearly
how far its emphasis on the distinction between contractual and statutory
,rights is to be carried in this context. Is it a specific exemption for the "highest priority" national policy against discrimination or is it capable of further
43
expansion into other areas involving statutory rights?
At least one aspect of the role of arbitration under the national labor
policy seems to have suffered a rebuff from the Court. Many arbitrators
had responded to the increased importance given to arbitration and the declining judicial predisposition 'to review arbitral awards in employment dispute cases by arguing that arbitration itself should become more judicial in
character through the incorporation or expanded use of such devices as discovery and due process. 44 Both the Court's rejection of the Rios standards
43. Already a district court has found no valid reason to distinguish between discrimination in employment actions brought under Title VII and those brought under the Civil
Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), and has extended the Alexander holding
to include this additional class of actions. McMiller v. Bird & Son, Inc., 376 F. Supp.
1086 (W.D. La. 1974). At least one attempt to extend the statutory-contractual dichotomy developed in Alexander to other areas of labor law has already appeared in the
scholarly journals. See Getman, Can Collyer and Gardner-Denver Co-Exist? A Postscript, 49 IND. L.J. 285 (1974). But see Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368
(1974), handed down the preceding month, where the Court voted 8 to 1 to preserve
the presumption of arbitrability in a situation where the subject was arguably exempted
by statute. It is ironic that Mr. Justice Douglas who did so much to shape the judicial
attitude toward arbitration through his opinions for the Court in Lincoln Mills and the
Steelworkers Trilogy should now find himself the lone dissenter opposing the further extension of that attitude.
44. See, e.g., Gross, The Labor Arbitrator'sRole: Tradition and Change, 25 ARB. J.
(n.s.) 221 (1970). For the contrary view, that although increased emphasis upon due
process might tend toward a fuller protection of the rights of individuals, it would also
complicate the relationship between union and employer and thus might "diminish the
union's ability to subsequently act in the most advantageous fashion for the majority of
the workers," see Edwards, Due Process Considerationsin Labor Arbitration, 25 ARB. J.
(n.s.) 141, 169 (1970). The distinctions here are especially relevant to Alexander's case
in that although his complaint was filed under article 4 (the "just cause" section) of the
collective bargaining agreement, his subsequent conduct made clear that he intended it
to be treated under the discrimination clause (art. 5, § 2). 415 U.S. at 39 nn.1
& 2. The union, however, seems to have treated the matter in a manner more consistent
with the former than the latter category. Whether this was due to the union's greater
familiarity with "just cause" procedures, misunderstanding, or the emphasis characteristic
of the arbitration procedures, in focusing upon the facts of a single case rather than the
marshalling of the comparative data required for the showing of discriminatory treatment, is not clear from the available facts. In any event, neither Alexander's argument
that others with equally unsatisfactory work records had not been discharged nor his
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of deferral and its accentuation of the "efficient, inexpensive and expeditious" nature of the arbitral process can hardly be viewed as offering en45
couragement to such proposals.
James L. DeMarce

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW-Hearings Before The
Communications Commission-Fact That Applicant
License Had Blacks On Its Board Of Directors Must
sidered And Accorded A Comparative Merit By The

Federal
For TV
Be ConCommis-

sion. TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 95 S. Ct. 245 (1974).
The question of whether the courts should give preference to minority
groups in order to remedy the effects of past racial discrimination has arisen
recently in a number of different contexts.' In TV 9, Inc. v. FCC,2 the issue
arose in 'a case which involved hearings before the Federal Communications
Commission on a permit to construct and operate a television station. The
question presented was whether black ownership and participation in the
management of an applicant corporation should be considered as a comparacontention that it was customary following the discharge of trainees to return them to
their previous less skilled job assignments prevailed. Appendix Brief at 12-16. The arbitrator specifically noted that the union had failed to adduce sufficient proof of the latter practice. Appendix Brief at 22.
45. It is in this context that the Court's recital of the classic pre-Lincoln Mills definition of the arbitrator's function by the late Dean Shulman is to be read. 415 U.S.
at 53 n.16 (1974).
1. DeFunis v. Odegaard, 94 S. Ct. 1704 (1974) (minority preferences in law school
admission); Contractor's Ass'n v. Secretary of Labor, 442 F.2d 159 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 854 (1971) (minority preferences in employment by government contractors); Norwalk CORE v. Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1968) (urban renewal plans for relocation of minorities).
2. 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 245 (1974). This case is
a consolidation of the appeals of TV 9, Inc. [TV 9], Comint Corporation [Comint], Central Nine Corporation [Central Nine] and Florida Heartland Television, Inc. [Florida
Heartland], all of whose applications had been denied by the Commission. Mid-Florida
Television Corporation [Mid-Florida], the successful applicant, intervened in each of these
appeals. TV 9 intervened in the appeals of Comint, Central Nine, and Florida Heartland.
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tive factor and accorded a comparative merit by the Commission. The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has answered in the affirmative. In so doing, the court reversed the FCC's decision
on the matter and addressed the problem of affirmative racial preferences
within a new context. The decision suggests a substantial broadening of the
factors that the FCC may consider in comparative licensing hearings. It also
suggests that the racial preference issue may be determined in administrative
proceedings by statutory interpretation alone-to the exclusion of constitutional analysis.
The history of this litigation is long and complex. The case was not new
to the court of appeals.8 The question of who was to have the right to operate a TV station on Channel 9 in Orlando, Florida had been before the
Commission and the court for more than two decades. 4 TV 9, however,
marked the first time in the controversy that the court had considered the
issue of black ownership. While several issues were raised on appeal, this
Note will be limited to a discussion of the racial preference question. 5
Comint Corporation, the only applicant to raise the issue of racial preferences, entered the litigation in 1965 when the court of appeals vacated
the Commission's grant of interim operating authority to applicant Mid-FloridA Television Corporation and ordered the proceedings opened to additional applicants. 6 After the FCC on remand had ,awarded interim authority
to a joint venture composed of all the applicants, 7 the controversy proceeded
to comparative hearings to determine who would be awarded a construction
permit for the new station.8
3. The court had considered various aspects of the controversy on five prior occasions: Consolidated Nine, Inc. v. FCC, 403 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1968); WORZ, Inc.
v. FCC, 345 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 893 (1965); WORZ, Inc. v.
FCC, 323 F.2d 618 (D.C. Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 914 (1964); WORZ, Inc.
v. FCC, 268 F.2d 889 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 805 (1959); WORZ, Inc. v.
FCC, 257 F.2d 199 (D.C. Cir.), vacated, 358 U.S. 55 (1958).
4. A detailed history of the course of the litigation from 1954 through 1968 is contained in Consolidated Nine, Inc. v. FCC, 403 F.2d 585, 586-89 (D.C. Cir. 1968).
5. Three other issues were raised on appeal. The first was whether the Commission's commingling of admissible and inadmissible evidence with respect to Mid-Florida's
prior operation on Channel 9 was prejudicial error, The second was whether certain
ex parte contacts with a former Commissioner on behalf of Mid-Florida should result
in a comparative demerit to Mid-Florida. The third issue was whether the federal indictment of a former officer of Mid-Florida should be considered in assessing Mid-Florida's character qualifications.
6. WORZ, Inc. v. FCC, 345 F.2d 85 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 893 (1965).
7. Consolidated Nine, Inc., 15 F.C.C.2d 825 (1969).
8. The award of a construction permit by the Commission is tantamount to the

award of an 6peiating license. According to the Communications Act, an operator's li-
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At the comparative hearings, Comint contended that it should have been
awarded a preference over the other applicants because two members of its
board of directors were black, owned stock interest in Comint, and would
participate in the management of the station. Dr. James R. Smith, a medical doctor and one of the black directors, was to serve on one committee of
the station. He did not propose to devote any specific amount of time to
its operation. The other black director was Paul C. Perkins, an Orlando attorney, who was to assume the office of station vice-president and devote
two days a week to the operation of the station. Together they owned
slightly more than a fourteen per cent voting stock interest in Comint. Neither had had prior experience in broadcasting, although both had been active in the civil rights movement in Orlando.9
It was Comint's position that this black ownership would be in the public
interest since roughly one-quarter of the population of Orlando was black
and the interests of blacks had been neglected in the past by local broadcast
stations.' 0 It pointed out that of the twenty-six commercial television stations in Florida, including two others in Orlando besides Channel 9, none
was owned by blacks." Comint argued that black ownership and management of Channel 9 would make the station "truly responsive" to the needs
of the Orlando black community.
I.

BLACK OWNERSHIP:

THE

FCC POSITION

The FCC decided the issue on the basis of licensing standards contained in
the Communications Act of 193412 and the Commission's Policy Statement
cense will be issued to the holder of a construction permit as soon as construction is
completed pursuant to the terms of the permit. 47 U.S.C. § 319(c) (1970).
9. Dr. Smith and Mr. Perkins testified as to their reasons for joining in Comint's
application during the course of the comparative hearings. Dr. Smith testified: "I think
it is important that black people-when you say so and so owns something, there is a
black person that owns it. They should be part owners as a part of the community.
This is the only answer to our black problem." Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.
2d 34, 170 (1970). Mr. Perkins testified that he joined in the application because he
"knew that this would be a chance for a Negro, because to my knowledge no Negro
in the State of Florida was in any policy making or had any part or participated in ownership of any television station and I knew this was a chance and it was a needed thing."
id. at 169-70.
10. Id. at 175 n.71.
11. Brief for Appellant Comint at 35, TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir.
1973). This statistic was indicative of the nationwide situation as well. At the time
of the litigation, only ten of the roughly 7,500 radio stations in the country were owned

by blacks. Of the more than 1,000 TV stations, none were black-owned.

See FEDERAL

CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT EFFORT, A REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES COMM'N ON

CIVIL RIcrS 280 (1971), cited in 33 F.C.C.2d at 18 n.43.
12. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1970).
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on Comparative Broadcast Hearings (1965 Policy Statement) .13 The Act
itself gave the Commission little definitive guidance as to licensing standards. It merely provided that license applications would be granted if the
"public interest, convenience, and necessity" would thereby be served. 14 In
1965, therefore, the Commission gave added definition to this public interest
standard in its 1965 Policy Statement. 5 According to the 1965 Policy Statement, -the primary objectives of comparative broadcast hearings were to insure the "best practicable service to the public" and "a maximum diffusion
of control of -the media of mass communications."' 6 In achieving these objectives, the Commission would consider several criteria. Diversification of
control of the media, full ,time participation by owners in station management,
and prior broadcast record were factors of particular relevance to the quesI
tion of black ownership. "
The initial decision' s was released by the FCC hearing examiner' 9 in June
1970, awarding the construction permit to Mid-Florida. Although he noted
13. 1 F.C.C.2d 393 (1965).
14. 47 U.S.C. § 309(a) (1970). This broad mandate has been termed "the high water mark of congressional abdication of power to the regulatory agency." 4 D.
SCHWARTZ, THE ECONOMIC REGULATION OF BUSINESS AND INDUSTRY:
A LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY OF U.S. REGULATORY AGENCIES 2374 (1973). The Commission's broad delega-

tion of authority has been validated by the U.S. Supreme Court in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943). The Court stated that the Communications Act gives the Commission "not niggardly but expansive powers." Id. at 219.
15. The Policy Statement was issued "to serve the purpose of clarity and consistency
of decision" and to be a "general review of the criteria governing the disposition of comparative broadcast hearings." 1 F.C.C.2d at 393-94. Prior to the Policy Statement, a
great deal of criticism had been directed at the Commission for its vagueness and unpredictability in decisionmaking. See, e.g., H. FRIENDLY, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCIES 73 (1962); G. WARREN, THE FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT AND
THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES 72-113 (1947).
16. 1 F.C.C.2d at 394.
17. Id. at 394-98. The other criteria were (1) proposed program service, (2) efficient use of frequency, (3) character, and (4) other factors that might contribute evidence of an applicant's qualifications. The Policy Statement did not assign a numerical
weight or value to any of the criteria. Neither does the Commission simply "add up
points" to determine which applicant is to be chosen to receive a license in a particular
case. Rather, the process involves the application of these criteria to the facts at issue.
What factors will predominate in a given situation is left to the informed judgement of
the administrative law judges and review board members. For a discussion of this process, see Irion, FCC Criteria For Evaluating Competing Applicants, 43 MINN. L. REv.
479 (1959).
18. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 34 (1970).
19. The general authority for the Commission's delegation of power to hearing examiners (now referred to as administrative law judges) and review boards is contained
in 47 U.S.C. § 155(d)(1) (1970). The specific authority of administrative law judges
in presiding over comparative hearings is outlined in 47 C.F.R. § 0.341 (1973).
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that media ownership by blacks in -the Orlando area was a "closed door," 20
the examiner nevertheless concluded that Comint could not be awarded a
preference for its black ownership. He stated that the "Communications Act,
like the Constitution, is color blind. What the Communications Act demands
is service to the public

. . .

and that factor alone must control the licensing

process, not the race, color, or creed of an applicant."' 21 Additionally, the
examiner noted what he perceived as the long involvement of Mid-Florida's
white owners in working with Orlando's black community, 22 and concluded
from this -that Comint's black ownership did not imply an ability or predisposition to render a service to the black community that other applicants
23
could not provide.
The FCC Review Board 24 affirmed the initial decision in January 1972.25
It found that black ownership per se did not fit within the objectives or
criteria outlined in the 1965 Policy Statement. Indeed, such ownership
could only be analogized to local residency-a factor no longer recognized
by the Commission as an independent criterion of comparison. 26 Mid-Florida was awarded the license on the basis of its "substantially superior showing" in the integration of ownership and management and the "unusually
27
good" broadcast record of its owner.
The Commissioners unanimously denied petitions for review of the Board's
decision. 28 Commissioner Benjamin L. Hooks, however, filed a separate
statement in which he vigorously disagreed with the view 'that black ownership per se could not be considered to be in the public interest. 29 He also
20. 33 F.C.C.2d at 169.
21.

Id. at 268.

22. Id. at 59-65.
23. The administrative law judge stated:
Unless Comint showed that the participation of Mr. Perkins and Dr. Smith in
the operation of the station would use their experience, background and knowledge of the community in a way likely to result in a superior service it cannot

prevail on this point.

There is nothing in the degree or type of participation

proposed by Mr. Perkins and Dr. Smith which gives assurance that the benefits

of their racial background would inure in any material degree to the operation
of the station.
Id. at 268.
24. The scope of authority of the Review Board is described in 47 C.F.R. § 0.365(a)
(1973).
25. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 1 (1972).

26. Id. at 18.
27.

Id. at 21.

28. Mid-Florida Television Corp., 37 F.C.C.2d 559 (1972). Since review of the Review Board's decision had been denied by the Commission, the Board's decision carried
the force of a decision by the Commission itself. 47 U.S.C. § 155 (d)(3) (1970).
29. Commissioner Hooks stated:
The proposition-simply spelled BLACK MEDIA OWNERSHIP IS IN THE

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 24:135

disagreed with the Review Board that the objectives and criteria of the
1965 Policy Statement precluded consideration of black ownership as a compaxative faotor.8 0 Commissioner Hooks nonetheless joined in the Commission's decision since he believed the black ownership issue was not of "decisional significance" ' in the case.
II.

BLACK OWNERSHIP:

THE COURT'S POSITION

On appeal,32 the District of Columbia Circuit set aside the award to MidFlorida and remanded the case to the Commission for rehearing. The opinion of Senior Circuit Judge Fahy took "a stand against heavy reliance upon
the maintenance of the status quo" in the communications industry and held
that Comint should have been accorded merit by the Commission. 3 The
court broadly interpreted the "public interest" standard of the Communications Act:
To say that the Communications Act, like the Constitution, is color
blind, does not fully describe the breadth of the public interest criterion embodied in the Act. . . . The thrust of the public interest opens to the Commission a wise discretion to8 4consider factors
which do not find expression in constitutional law.
The court also held that the Commission had misapplied the 1965 Policy
Statement. The objectives of the Policy Statement did not rule out consideration of the racial issue; for it was not intended "to preclude the full examination of any relevant and substantial factor."8 8
The court reaffirmed the requirement laid down by the Supreme Court in
Ashbacker Radio Corp. v. FCC,8 6 that competing applicants for a construction permit be accorded a full comparative hearing before Commission action on their applications. The court of appeals also pointed to its own dePUBLIC INTEREST-is so self-evident in this day and age that I cannot endure agonizing a patient recrudescence of what the black struggle is all about,
nor will I list the decisions demonstrating the breadth with which the Commission has perceived the 'public interest' when it has so desired.
37 F.C.C.2d at 562-63.
30. Id. at 562.
31. Id. at 560.
32. The Communications Act provides that an applicant whose application for construction permit or station license has been denied by the Commission may appeal to
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 47 U.S.C.
§ 402(b)(1) (1970).
33. 495 F.2d at 937. Along with Senior Circuit Judge Fahy, Chief Judge BazetOn
and Circuit Judge Robinson heard the case on appeal.
34. Id. at 936.
35. Id. at 936-37.
36. 326 U.S. 327 (1945). Ashbacker was important in that it defined the Commission's responsibilities under section 309(a) of the Act with respect to comparative hear-
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cision in Citizens Communications Center v. FCC,3 7 which held that applicants in comparative hearings must be judged on all relevant criteria, including plans for the integration of minority groups into station operation.38
The court emphasized its view that "[a]s new interest groups and hitherto
silent minorities emerge in our society, they should be given some stake in
'and the chance to broadcast on our radio and television frequencies. '3 9 Consideration of black ownership as a comparative factor was thus seen by the
TV 9 court as being consistent with the 1965 Policy Statement's "primary
objective" of diversification of media ownership. "We hold only that when
minority ownership is likely to increase diversity of content, especially of
' 40
opinion and viewpoint, merit should be awarded."
The court seemed well aware of some of the practical objections its decision would elicit. It specifically disavowed any asttempt to impose a quota
system upon applicants or the Commission. 41 Moreover, black ownership
was not to be offered as a "mere token," but "in good faith as broadening
community representation," if merit was to be afforded the applicant. 42 The
court also took cognizance of minority inexperience in the operation of TV
stations and the difficulty such groups 'might have in giving 'advance assurance of superior community service in comparative hearings. Thus, "reasonable expectation" of community service, not advance assurance, was to be
the 'basis for which merit would be accorded where minorities were concerned. 4 3 Finally, the court emphasized that because minority ownership
was in accord with the goals of public policy, the fact that non-minority applicants proposed to present the views of 'the Orlando black community
44
could not offset the merit to 'be accorded Comint.
ings. The essence of the decision is that mutually exclusive applicants for a construction permit are entitled to full comparative hearings before Commission action. The
decision formed the basis for further litigation that was to determine what standards of
comparison should be considered at such hearings. See, e.g., Community Broadcasting
Corp. v. FCC, 363 F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1966); and Johnston Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,
175 F.2d 351 (D.C. Cir. 1949).

37. 463 F.2d 822 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
38. Id. at 823.

39. 495 F.2d at 937 (citation omitted).
40. Id. at 938.
41.

Id. at 937-38.

42. Id. at 937. The court did not indicate what degree of ownership would be more
than a "mere token." Commissioner Hooks had earlier indicated that he would consider
any equity in excess of five per cent to be "substantial" ownership. 37 F.C.C.2d at 564
n.19.
43. 495 F.2d at 938. This position is of course in direct conflict with that taken
by the administrative law judge in the initial decision. See note 23 supra.
44. 495 F.2d at 938. This was so, the court noted, because minority ownership had
historically proven to be influential in achieving diversity in editorial content and pres-
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Both Mid-Florida and the Commission unsuccessfully petitioned for a
rehearing en bane. In denying Mid-Florida's petition, the court filed
a supplemental opinion which sought to clarify the earlier ruling. Judge
Fahy's majority opinion explained that the "merit" to be accorded Comint
was not the same as a "preference." A preference was defined as a
decision by the Commission that one applicant's qualifications on a certain
issue were superior to those of another. A merit, on the other hand, was
merely a recognition by the Commission that an applicant had demonstrated
certain positive qualities which could, but would not necessarily, result in an
outcome-determinative preference. 45 Thus the fact that Comin-t was to be
accorded a merit did not mean that the other applicants would be unable to
prove on remand that they could better serve the Orlando community. 46
The supplemental opinion also applied the court's "reasonable expectation"
standard to the participation of Dr. Smith and Mr. Perkins. Although their
positions were technically not managerial in the sense of the day-to-day operation of the station, it was nevertheless probable that their stock ownership
and "substantial identification" with minority rights in Orlando would translate into a meaningful effect upon station programming and hence into service to the black community. 47
Four judges dissented and would have granted the petitions for rehearing
en bane. Judges MacKinnon, Robb and Tamm could find no substantial
difference between "merit" and a "preference." Each, if based on race, was
discriminatory and impermissible. 48 Judge Wilkey likewise characterized
the distinction as "semantics," and stated that the majority's decision was
"constitutionally wrong, morally wrong, and dangerous. '49
III.

CONCLUSION

In ruling in favor of Comint on the black ownership question, the Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit acted in accord with prior decisions in which it had sought to afford minority groups access to media ownership. In Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC,50 for example, the court
stated that the role of the Commission in license renewal hearings was not
merely to insure that applicants had technically met prescribed minimum
entation. The Supreme Court has indicated that such diversity is required by the first
amendment. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
45. 495 F.2d at 941 n.2.
46. Id. at 941 n.3.
47. Id. at 942.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 923 (1971).
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standards, but that the Commission could "seek in the public interest to certify as licensees those who would speak out with fresh voice, would most nat' 51
urally initiate, encourage and expand diversity of approach and viewpoint."
In Citizens Communications Center v. FCC,52 the court struck down an FCC
policy 53 that permitted incumbent licensees to have their licenses renewed
without a comparative hearing. The court found that this policy impeded
54
diversification of media ownership.
But if TV 9 is consistent with the court's prior position on access to media
ownership, the decision is an abrupt change in the court's attitude toward
the 1965 Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings. Prior to

TV 9, the court had apparently looked with favor upon the Commission's
application of the Policy Statement's definitive objectives and criteria.5" The
decision in TV 9 seems both -to signal a change in judicial attitude and to
dilute the Policy Statement's attempt to lend more definition and standardization to comparative 'broadcast hearings.
The decision also seems to demonstrate that the court will not hesitate
to take an active role in reviewing and overturning Commission decisions
where its perception of the needs of public policy so dictates. This stance,
too, seems ,an abrupt change from the court's prior philosophy as to its role
in reviewing the decisions of administrative agencies. 5 6
51. 444 F.2d at 860.
52. 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
53. Policy Statement on Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applications (1970 Policy Statement), 22 F.C.C.2d 424 (1970). This Policy Statement allowed
incumbent licensees to be granted license renewals without a comparative hearing, upon
a showing by the incumbent that it had been "substantially attuned" to the needs of the
community and had demonstrated no "serious deficiencies." 22 F.C.C.2d at 424-25.
The 1970 Policy Statement was challenged by several organizations which argued that
it unfairly favored the maintenance of the status quo in the communications media and
seriously impaired minority access to media ownership. See 447 F.2d at 1202 n.2.
54. 447 F.2d at 1213 n.36.
55. The court had previously reviewed and affirmed the Commission's treatment of
the 1965 Policy Statement. See What the Bible Says, Inc., 28 F.C.C.2d 551 (1971), aft'd
sub nom. Oxbow Broadcasting Corp. v. FCC, No. 71-1783 (D.C. Cir., Nov. 8, 1972);
Lorain Community Broadcasting Co., 13 F.C.C.2d 106 (1968), ajj'd sub nom. Allied
Broadcasting, Inc. v. FCC, 435 F.2d 68 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Ultravision Broadcasting Co.,
11 F.C.C.2d 394 (1968), af 'd sub nom. WEBR, Inc. v. FCC, 420 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir
1969); Milam and Lansam, 6 F.C.C.2d 198 (1966), af'd sub nom. Christian Fundamental Church v. FCC, No. 21, 123 (D.C. Cir., April 11, 1968); Community Broadcasting Service, Inc., 2 F.C.C.2d 53 (1965), afj'd, 377 F.2d 143 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
See Brief for Appellee at 22 n.10, TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495 F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
56. In Greater Boston Television Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), the
court indicated that it would intervene in an agency's decision if it became aware that
the agency had not taken a "hard look" at the relevant problems and had not engaged
in reasoned decisionmaking. However, if the agency had examined the salient issues,
the court would exercise restraint and affirm the agency's decision "even though the

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 24:135

A final question with regard to TV 9 is whether the issue presented should
have been limited to the context in which it arose. Although the court noted
that the Supreme Court had recognized a connection between first amendment requirements and diversity in media ownership,5 7 the majority was apparently satisfied that the black ownership issue in TV 9 could be fully and
appropriately resolved within the administrative context-without a constitutional analysis. The majority's unwillingness to consider the constitutional
implications of the issue is underscored by its refusal to consider the constitutional arguments put forth by Comint and Mid-Florida in their briefs.5 8
A minority of the court of appeals apparently would have considered the
constitutional dimensions of the issue on a rehearing en banc. One important dimension would presumably have been whether the absence of black
ownership in the Orlando area had in fact been the product of prior racial
discrimination. 9 Another could have been whether the classification of
applicants according to race for the purposes of awarding merit constituted
a "suspect" classification. Resolution of these constitutional dimensions of
the black ownership issue in TV 9 could perhaps have shed some light on
the important question of whether the equal protection guarantee of the
court would on its own account have made different findings or adopted different standards." Id. at 851. In WEBR, Inc. v. FCC, 420 F.2d 158 (D.C. Cir. 1969), the court
indicated that where an agency's decision finds substantial support in the record of proceedings, the court may not interpose its power to overturn that decision. Id. at 160.
These views are in accord with FCC v. WOKO, Inc., 329 U.S. 223 (1946), where the
Court stated that the fact that a court might not make the same determination on the
same set of facts does not warrant "a substitution of judicial for administrative discretion since Congress has confided the problem to the latter." It was also stated that
"it is the Commission, not the courts, which must be satisfied that the public interest
will be served." Id. at 229.
57. 495 F.2d at 937. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390
(1969); Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
58. Comint argued that the Constitution required the award of a preference for minority ownership where a valid need existed. It relied in part on Norwalk CORE v.
Norwalk Redevelopment Agency, 395 F.2d 920 (2d Cir. 1968). There the court had
indicated that classification by race was not "inevitably" impermissible. Where done for
the purposes of achieving equality, such a classification could be constitutionally required. Id. at 931-32. See Brief for Appellant Comint at 41, TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495
F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Mid-Florida argued that any reliance on Norwalk CORE
was inapposite since Comint had made no showing that the absence of blacks in media
ownership was the result of racial discrimination. It concluded that the Commission's
refusal to award a preference for minority ownership was "well within the mainstream
of current American Constitutional and social policy which prohibits the invidious classification of race to be utilized as a factor for determining how public franchises, designed
to serve the public, will be issued." Brief for Intervenor at 26, TV 9, Inc. v. FCC, 495
F.2d 929 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
59. The issue has been of primary importance in the recent cases dealing with affirmative racial preferences. See cases cited note 1 supra.
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fifth amendment 00 encompasses affirmative racial preferences.
The court has taken a strong step in facilitating the diversification of ownership in the mass media. Perhaps this goal indeed justifies the court's intervention into an area of responsibility assigned by Congress to the Federal
Communications Commission. Nevertheless, one would have hoped that the
court would first have developed a firm constitutional foundation for taking
that step.
Richard L. Guido

CIVIL PROCEDURE - Federal Declaratory Jurisdiction "Genuine Threat of Enforcement of a Disputed State Statute"
Is the Threshold Standard for Federal Declaratory Intervention
into State Criminal Proceedings. Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S.
452 (1974).

A primary concern in constitutional litigation is the accessibility of federal
courts. Deferring to considerations of "comity and federalism,"' the Supreme
Court has severely restricted the opportunities for federal courts to grant prospective relief to persons involved in pending state prosecution. The Court
recently curtailed its restrictive trend, ,however, in Steffel v. Thompson.2 In
doing so, it fashioned a new threshold requirement for plaintiffs seeking declaratory relief against threatened state prosecution.
The case involved a pair of anti-Viet Nam War leafleteers who challenged
a Georgia criminal trespass statute.3 Richard Steffel and Sandra Becker,
while actively distributing anti-war handbills in a large suburban shopping
center,4 were requested to leave by center employees and later by local po60. Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499 (1954).
1. Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971).
2. 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
3.

GA. CODE ANN. § 26-1503 (1972).

4. For discussion of the substantive law on the right to distribute handbills on private property (company-owned town), see Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).
For discussion of the right to leaflet in a privately owned shopping center, see Lloyd
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lice. Petitioners quit their activity but reappeared two days later. After further warning, Steffel again ceased his distributions but Becker refused to quit
and was 'arrested. Both persons commenced action in federal district court,5
seeking an injunction -against enforcement of the trespass statute and a judgment declaring the Georgia law to be a deprivation of first and fourteenth
amendment rights. The district judge dismissed the suits of both Steffel and
Becker. Plaintiff Steffel appealed to the Fifth Circuit," which affirmed the
lower court decision. 7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on Steffel's
prayer for declaratory relief and subsequently reversed the lower court.
Steflel is important in that it helps define the previously disputed parameters of the February Sextet doctrine, 8 formerly the primary hurdle to federal intervention in state criminal matters. This Note will explore the limiting effect Steffel has upon the doctrine. The principal task will be to define
the circumstances wherein an individual may seek prospective protection of
his civil rights through federal disruption of state criminal processes.
I.

PENDING PROSECUTION-DEVELOPING STANDARDS OF
JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT

The power of federal courts to enjoin state proceedings can be traced to
Chisholm v. Georgia,9 an opinion rendered by Chief Justice John Marshall,
which, though preceding the enactment of the eleventh amendment, was in
essence affirmed in 1908. After defining this power, however, the courts felt
compelled to exercise it in a manner consistent with basic tenets of federalism
and judicial economy. Two tests emerged under which federal court injuncCorp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (1972); Amalgamated Food Employees Union v. Logan
Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308 (1968).
5. Becker v. Thompson, 334 F. Supp. 1386 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
6. Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1972).
7. A rehearing en banc was subsequently denied per curiam. Becker v. Thompson,
463 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir. 1972).
8. The February Sextet is composed of the following six cases: Younger v. Harris,
401 U.S. 37 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); Boyle v. Landry, 401
U.S. 77 (1971); Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82 (1971); Dyson v. Stein, 40 U.S. 200
(1971); and Byrne v. Karalexis, 401 U.S. 216 (1971). All six decisions were rendered
on the same day.
9. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793), Marshall held that federal
courts could entertain a citizen's suit against a state without the state's prior consent.
The decision was bitterly criticized and was constitutionally reversed with the ratification of the eleventh amendment. In Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), the Supreme
Court circumvented the prohibition of the eleventh amendment, holding that citizens
have a right to enjoin a state official when that official is engaged in illegal or unconstitutional conduct.
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tions 'against state criminal proceedings would be measured: the doctrine of
federal abstention and the concept of irreparable injury.
The doctrine of abstention presupposes that state courts will conscientiously
exercise their responsibility to vindicate basic constitutional freedoms. The
doctrine is grounded upon considerations of judicial economy and federalism.
Judicial economy demands that federal courts avoid the duplication inherent
when two courts simultaneously adjudicate the same set of facts; federalism
requires federal judges to minimize intervention into traditional state functions by allowing state courts to rectify constitutional infirmities prior to federal review.
The second test, irreparable injury, involves the traditional equitable consideration of "alternate remedies." The basic issue is whether the plaintiff
would be able through "prompt trial and appeal" to forestall irreparable
h-arm. 10 Since good faith prosecution inherently allows the defendant to vindicate his rights at trial, most federal courts were reluctant to intervene in
ongoing state criminal proceedings. It was felt that under these circumstances federal courts could offer no protection not already offered by the
state."
These twin tests of abstention and irreparable injury merged to form a
strong federal policy against interference in contemporaneous state criminal
proceedings. Illustrative of the strength of this doctrine is Douglas v. City
of Jeannette,1 2 where the Supreme Court refused to enjoin a criminal prosecution under a city ordinance even -though the statute was patently uncon1
stitutional.
In 1965, the Supreme Court reexamined this policy in Dombrowski v. Pfister.1 4 Dombrowski differed from earlier cases in that it offered a blatant
example of "bad faith." Although petitioners" were arrested, repeatedly
threatened with prosecution,' 6 and otherwise harassed,' 7 no formal prosecu10. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 485 n.3 (1965).
11. See Becker v. Thompson, 459 F.2d 919, 924 (5th Cir. 1972) (Tuttle, J., concurring), quoting Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611, 620 (1968).
12. 319 U.S. 157 (1943).
13. In Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943), rendered the same day as
Douglas, the Court struck down the city ordinance in question.
14. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
15. Petitioners were the Southern Conference Educational Fund and James L. Dombrowski, the fund's executive director.
16. The statute invoked by state authorities was the Subversive Activities and Communist Control Law, LA. REv. STAT. §§ 14:358-74 (Cum. Supp. 1974), which prohibited
the "assisting" of any communist or subversive group.
17. Petitioners' homes and offices were raided at gun point. Voluminous material,
including membership lists and subscription lists, was seized. The loss of subscription
lists paralyzed petitioners' publications distributions. A state court subsequently quashed
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tion ever resulted. Petitioners finally sought injunctive relief against further
enforcement of the statute in question, alleging that it was unconstituional
on its face and could not be invoked with any realistic hope of obtaining a
valid conviction. The Court deemed federal restraint inappropriate under
these conditions. First, -it noted that first amendment rights by their very
nature cannot be assured of ample vindication", by a criminal defense since
even a good faith prosecution can irreparably discourage free expression and
association. 19 On the basis of the rights involved, therefore, a federal injunction was the only viable relief.
Second, the Court argued that a narrow interpretation of the Act by the
state court could in no way meet the claim that the statute was applied solely
to discourage the exercise of first amendment rights. Moreover, the state's
overt failure to prosecute denied plaintiffs the chance -to challenge the statute
with a criminal defense based on constitutional grounds. This presence of
bad faith, coupled with the fragile nature of the rights involved, thus rendered
the theories of comity and abstention inapplicable. A new threshold standard emerged: federal courts could enjoin state prosecution if a statute was
attacked "on [its] face as abridging free expression" and the statute was in' 20
voked "in bad faith to impose continuing harassment.
Two years later, the Supreme Court defined federal jurisdictional standards
for declaratory relief in the absence of actual state prosecution in Zwickler
v. Koota.21 Appellant alleged that a state statutory prohibition against the
distribution of anonymous handbills was overbroad on its face. The Court
first observed that defects in precisely drafted overbroad statutes cannot be
cured by subsequent state court construction. Hence, the concept of abstention was not applicable. Second, the Court noted that the Judiciary Act of
the arrest warrants and suppressed all confiscated evidence. State officials nevertheless
continued their harassment by threatening further prosecution, and the police publicly
displayed xerox copies of petitioners' illegally seized membership lists and leaked information from petitioner's subscription files.
18. 380 U.S. at 485-86.
19. Justice Brennan relied in part upon NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958).
This case recognized that anonymity sometimes is a prerequisite for unfettered exercise
of the right of association. Thus, the publicity inherent in any litigation may render
even good faith prosecution harmful to certain rights. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S.
479, 488-89 (1965). Consequently, the Court created an exception to the rule of standing. The equitable relief authorized in Dombrowski is an alternate remedy to this problem.
20. 380 U.S. at 490.
21. 389 U.S. 241 (1967). Appellant's initial conviction was overturned on state law
grounds because the state failed to prove a necessary element of the offense. Appellant,
alleging a chilling effect, subsequently sought federal relief in the form of an injunction
against further enforcement of the statute and a judgment declaring the statute unconstitutional.
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187522 made the federal courts the primary forum for protection of constitutional rights. Inherent in this status is the "duty" to "give due respect to
a suitor's choice of a federal forum for the hearing and decision of his federal
constitutional claims."' 23 Therefore, absent "narrowly limited 'special circumstances,' "24 federal courts should exercise their powers even though an
alternate state forum may exist.
Finally, the Court noted that Congress intended declaratory judgments to
be a more easily obtainable and less obtrusive alternative to injunctions. Requiring the standard of irreparable equitable harm as a requisite for both
forms of relief would dilute this difference. Hence requests for declaratory
relief must be considered independently of the standard for equity. The
lower court was therefore held in error for dismissing the prayer for declaratory relief for want of -irreparable harm.
Dombrowski and Zwickler, when read together, significantly increased the
availability of federal courts for prospective relief from state criminal enforcement. Their scope, however, was severely restricted in the February Sextet.
In the lead case of Younger v. Harris,2 5 Justice Black argued that principles
of "comity and federalism" require minimal federal intervention into -traditional state affairs. In cases involving pending state prosecution, the requisite
for federal injunctive relief is a showing of truly severe and immediate irrep22. Act of March 3, 1875, ch. 137, § 1, 18 Stat. 470.
23. 389 U.S. at 248.
24. Id. The Court did not fully explain the nature or scope of this caveat. A state
court's avoidance or modification of a constitutional question, done in the course of construing a state statute, was cited as one example of the "narrowly limited" circumstances
which justified intervention. See Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959). The
Zwickler Court also found "special circumstances" in cases involving diversity of citizenship and in cases involving disruption of complex state administrative processes. 389
U.S. at 249 n. 11. In the latter instances, however, the presence of unsettled questions
of controlling state law were prominent and appeared to be the decisive common element.
The Fifth Circuit has construed this caveat of "special circumstances" to specifically
include certain subjects. See Barrett v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 444 F.2d 38, 43-44 (5th
Cir. 1971). Judge Wisdom asserted for a unanimous panel that certain subjects vital to a
state's political or economic interests should per se preclude federal intervention. Examples given were state water management, state fishery administration, state mineral policy, and the law of eminent domain. Wisdom cited Justice Brennan's concurrence,
joined by Justices Marshall and Douglas, in Kaiser Steel Corp. v. W.S. Ranch Co., 391
U.S. 593 (1968), as authority. However, although Justice Brennan's language is supportive of the Fifth Circuit's position, the facts of Kaiser involved a "truly novel" issue
of state law. Id. at 594. Thus, Kaiser cannot be viewed as expanding the definition
of "special circumstances." Indeed, as an alternative reason for abstaining in Barrett,
Judge Wisdom noted the presence of conflicting state statutes. No other court has favorably cited the Fifth Circuit position.
25. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
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arable harm. The alleged injury cannot be of a type that could be remedied
by a one-time criminal defense.2 6 The anxiety inherent in preparing a criminal defense does not meet the test. The harassment found in Dombrowski,
however, was held to be sufficient. Younger thus isolated the element of
bad faith and declared it to be the sole justification for federal intervention
into pending litigation. 27 Federal injunctive relief was precluded in all but
the most exigent circumstances.
Younger's companion, Samuels v. Mackell,2 extended this restrictive test
to cases involving declaratory judgments. The Court found, where prosecution is pending, that the effect of a declaration was equal to that of an injunction: massive disruption of state proceedings. The considerations of comity
and federalism announced in Younger, requiring minimal federal intervention into state affairs, made such a result clearly improper. Samuels represented a two-fold departure from earlier precedent: the existence of formal
charges was held to preclude declaratory judgments in the absence of bad
faith and the presence of prosecution was held to allow singular treatment
of prayers for equitable and declaratory relief. Both departures veered from
greater federal court accessibility.
In view of Younger and Samuels, the earlier expansive rules appeared to
be 'an aberration. The February Sextet gave the states a strong presumption
of legitimacy and a relatively free hand in the prosecution of their criminal
laws. 29 The mere presence of pending state action thus severely reduced the
avenues of access to federal courts for prospective relief.
II.

OPENING THE DoORS

Steffel faced an issue absent in Zwickler and expressly reserved in both
Younger and Samuels: whether federal courts can issue declaratory judgments in instances where criminal litigation is threatened but not pending.30
26. Justice Black relied heavily on Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157
(1943). In Douglas, Chief Justice Stone made a comparison with Hague v. CIO, 307

U.S. 496 (1939).

Stone noted that the respondent in Hague was subjected to forcible

dispersal of union meetings and deportation without trial.

In Douglas, however, plain-

tiff only alleged harm engendered by a standard criminal prosecution and equity was
withheld, while in Hague an injunction was issued.
27. Justice Brennan conceded other tests were employed in Dombrowski, but asserted,
that "such statements were unnecessary to the decision .......
401 U.S. at 50.
28. 401 U.S. 66 (1971).
29. The Younger standard was applied to the area of juvenile law in Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073, 1078-79 (3d Cir. 1973).
30. The Supreme Court did not break judicial ground in granting certiorari in this
case. The applicability of the bad faith harrassment test had earlier been considered
in Wulp v. Corcoran, 454 F.2d 826 (1st Cir. 1972); Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343
(3d Cir. 1971); and Crossen v. Breckenridge, 446 F.2d 833 (6th Cir. 1971). Addition-
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In addressing ithat question, the Court limited the force of Younger and
Samuels to circumstances where prosecution had actually commenced. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, first noted that a federal suit in the
absence of a bona fide state court action "does not result in duplicative legal
proceedings or disruption of the state criminal justice system." 3' He pointed
out .that the failure of the state to prosecute gives the individual a genuine
Hobson's choice: either flout the law and risk prosecution, or forego basic
civil rights.3 2 The majority concluded, therefore, that the "principles of
equity, comity, and federalism have little force in the absence of a pending
state proceeding."3 3 With its underpinnings eroded, Younger-Samuels was
held not controlling.
The majority opinion then analyzed ,the standards of traditional equity relief as they apply to declaratory judgment. With the limiting force of
Younger and Samuels removed, the Court found that Zwickler compelled
independent tests for equitable and declaratory relief.
The effect of Steffel on the February Sextet doctrine is clearly restrictive.
First, Steffel reduces Younger-Samuels from a per se test to a rule of degree.
The distinction between pending and threatened prosecution indicates that
state action per se is not determinative of federal powers. Instead, Steffel
holds the degree of state involvement to be the critical test. Where action
is only threatened, the degree of state involvement is simply not enough to
invoke the restrictive principles of comity and federalism. Second, Steffel
dispels the notion that Younger and Samuels created "new law" 3 4 of general
applicability. Instead, the Sextet doctrine is limited to a well-defined class
ally, two three-judge district panels had reviewed the issue in Thorns v. Smith, 334 F.
Supp. 1203 (D. Conn. 1971), and in Anderson v. Vaughn, 327 F. Supp. 101 (D. Conn.
1971). In both cases, the courts ruled that the Younger doctrine was inapplicable in
the absence of actual prosecution. Thus, the Fifth Circuit's rule in Becker v. Thompson,
459 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1972), was clearly the minority rule among the circuits. For
another example of the view of the Fifth Circuit, see Cooley v. Endictor, 340 F. Supp.
15 (N.D. Ga. 1971), afj'd, 458 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1115
(1973).
31. 415 U.S. at 462.
32. [W]hile a pending state prosecution provides the federal plaintiff with
a concrete opportunity to vindicate his constitutional rights, a refusal on the
part of the federal courts to intervene when no state proceeding is pending may
place the hapless plaintiff between the Scylla of intentionally flouting state law
and the Charybdis of foregoing what he believes to be constitutionally protected activity in order to avoid becoming enmeshed in a criminal proceeding.
Id. (citation omitted).
33. 415 U.S. at 462, quoting Lake Carriers' Ass'n v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498, 509
(1972).
34. See Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at 11-17, Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452
(1974).
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of cases involving pending prosecution. In all other instances, more liberal
standards control. 35
To fill the void created by the rejection of Younger-Samuels, Steffel
fashions a new rule for declaratory jurisdiction that in some respects is less
rigorous than 'the standard enunciated by the pre-Sextet precedents. Under
Steffel, a plaintiff can fulfill the article III requirement of an actual controversy merely by demonstrating "a genuine threat of enforcement of a disputed state statute." 36 This test relaxes the standard in Dombrowski since
demonstration of "genuine threat of enforcement" does not require a showing
of bad faith enforcement. Second, Steffel rejects any notion that declaratory
jurisdiction is limited to the facts of Dombrowski and Zwickler, both of which
involved allegations that the statute in question was overbroad. 7 The unqualified language employed by Justice Brennan does not preclude complaints based on 'alternative constitutional theories. Finally, Steffel rejects
-the -test of "facial infirmity" used in both Dombrowski and Zwickler. Indeed, the majority specifically rejected the contention that declarations can
be sought only where a statute is facially challenged and held declaratory relief to be proper where a statute is attacked as construed. 8 Thus, in three
critical 'areas Steffel reduces the hurdles to federal court intervention established in Dombrowski and Zwickler.
35. State taxation may be an exception to this statement. In both Matthews v. Rodgers, 284 U.S. 521 (1932), and Great Lakes Dredge and Dock Co. v. Huffman, 319 U.S.
293 (1943), the Supreme Court emphatically directed federal courts not to interfere with
a state program of taxation where the state offered adequate remedial procedures.
Matthews dealt with injunction and Great Lakes extended the rule to declaratory relief.
The decisions were based on a combination of theories: the existence of adequate remedy at law, a desire not to interfere in this sensitive area of state concern, and statutory
mandate. In Great Lakes, the Court analyzed the policy considerations underpinning
the statutory prohibition of federal injunctions against state tax collection (now 28
U.S.C. § 1341 (1970)) and found them sufficient to prohibit declaratory relief as well.
No mention of this line of cases was made in Steffel. Since Great Lakes rests on statutory policy as well as the equitable underpinnings found in Younger, it is doubtful that
Steffel's limitation on Younger would authorize federal declaratory intervention into
state tax collection activities. Cf. note 24 supra.
36. 415 U.S. at 475. Four Justices filed three separate concurrences. All were in
substantial agreement with this test.
37. This rejection of the jurisdictional requirement that the overbreadth of the statute
be alleged supports a recent trend in lower federal courts. Originally the facts of
Zwickler were incorporated into a "rule," so that allegations of facial overbreadth were
regarded as a requisite for federal declaratory jurisdiction. More recently, however, al-

legations of facial overbreadth have been viewed as only an example of circumstances
under which subsequent state court construction could not affect the constitutional issue.
See, e.g., King-Smith v. Aaron, 455 F.2d 378 (3d Cir. 1972) (statute held not overbroad
but violative of fourteenth amendment guarantees of equal protection and declaratory
jurisdiction taken).
38. 415 U.S. at 473. Contra, Jones v. Wade, 479 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1973).
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Although Steffel generally allows easier access to the federal courts, it does
not go as far as Dombrowski in providing special protection to first amendment freedoms. The liberal interpetation of Dombrowski, namely, that federal intervention can be obtained whenever an infringement of first amendment freedoms is alleged, had been rejected in Younger. With the restrictive
force of Younger eased, Dombrowski could be read as mandating federal intervention whenever first amendment rights are at issue. This analysis is precluded, however, by the test of "genuine threat of enforcement;" Steffel emphasizes that an apprehension of criminal proceedings, not a fear of damaged
rights, is the key threshold requirement. Indeed, Justice Stewart took pains
to emphasize that Ste fel
must not be understood as authorizing the invocation of federal declaratory judgment jurisdiction by a person who thinks a
state criminal law is unconstitutional, even if he genuinely feels
"chilled" in his freedom of action . . . and even if he honestly
entertains the subjective belief that he may now or in the future
be prosecuted under it.89
Thus, in one respect, Steffel narrows the channels of access to the federal
courts.
The limitation of the applicability of the February Sextet to instances of
pending prosecution resolves an important issue for constitutional litigators.
Some questions nevertheless remain. First, the practical impact of Stefel
upon future state prosecutions is unclear. Justice White 'alone asserted that
declarations should "be accorded res judicata effect in any later prosecution
of that very conduct. ' 40 Justice Rehnquist, joined by the Chief Justice, flatly
disgreed. 41
Second, the increased volume of cases that will fall within the new parameters is speculative and remains to -be seen. Justice Stewart remarked that
"[c]ases where such a 'genuine (threat' can be demonstrated will, I think, be
exceedingly rare."'42 Whether the new standard will actually result in more
litigation remains unknown. Third, Steffel reserved the issue of whether federal equity relief is available in instances where prosecution is threatened but
not pending. Finally, the Court abstained from defining the all important
term of "pending prosecution," either in terms of the parties involved, 43 in
39. 415 U.S. at 476 (Stewart, J., & Burger, C.J., concurring).
40. 415 U.S. at 477 (White, J., concurring).
41. 415 U.S. at 479 (Rehnquist, J. & Burger, C.J., concurring).
42. 415 U.S. at 476 (Stewart, J. & Burger, C.J., concurring).
43. The Supreme Court did not address this issue in Steffel. However, the fact that
prosecution had already commenced against Becker obviously did not preempt Steffel's
assertion that he was subject only to threatened action. This question has been ad-
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terms of the technical rules of procedure, 44 or in terms of prosecution initiated
45
after the petition for declaratory relief.
III.

THE JURISDICTIONAL MATRIX

The Steffel decision definitively resolved an unsettled jurisdictional issue.
Much of the guesswork previously inherent in seeking federal relief was
eliminated. It is clear that when state prosecution is underway, the minimum
requirement for federal intervention is a showing of severe, irreparable injury
resulting from bad faith enforcement. In the absence of actual litigation,
declaratory intervention may be obtained upon a demonstration of genuine
dressed in the lower federal courts. For example, in Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343
(3d Cir. 1971), twenty-seven of the original plaintiffs were granted jurisdiction to seek
declaratory relief against police harrassment after the claims of the remaining ten plaintiffs, who had previously been arrested, had been severed and dismissed. Apparently
the jurisdictional barrier of "pending prosecution" applies only to individual plaintiffs.
Thus, the offical charging of one party has no bearing on the status of any other so
long as the actions are separate. Accord, Conover v. Montemuro, 477 F.2d 1073 (3d
Cir. 1973). But cf. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 127 n.7 (1973) and Hamar Theatres,
Inc. v. Cryan, 365 F. Supp. 1312 (D.N.J. 1973), where a caveat is included regarding
class action suits. In Roe, a case involving prosecution for abortion, one Dr. Hallford
sought to "distinguish his status as a present state defendant from his status as a potential future defendant." 410 U.S. at 126. The Supreme Court refused to recognize the
distinction. However, the Court reserved the issue of whether "intervention on behalf
of a class would change the outcome." Id. at 127 n.7. In Hamar Theatres, a class action suit where three of the class members were subject to pending prosecution, the district court noted the Roe reservation and held that "where such class relief is sought, it
furthers the purposes of class adjudication to distinguish between . . . status as a present
criminal state defendant and . . . status as a potential future defendant." 365 F. Supp.
at 1320.
44. The Supreme Court, in the companion case to Younger, Byrne v. Karalexis, 401
U.S. 216 (1971), appeared to favor a flexible approach when using technical rules of
procedure to define "pending prosecution." In Byrne, respondent filed suit in federal
court after being indicted. Soon afterwards the original indictments were dismissed but
new ones were later issued. In a footnote to its per curiam opinion, the Court stated,
"[U]nder these circumstances we treat the state prosecution as pending at the time the
federal suit was initiated." 401 U.S. at 218 n.2. Lower federal courts have explicitly
construed this language as creating a flexible standard. Independent Tape Merchants
Ass'n v. Creamer, 346 F. Supp. 456, 460-61 (M.D. Pa. 1972); Burak v. Pennsylvania,
339 F. Supp. 534, 537 (E.D. Pa. 1972). Thus, the courts have tended to view each situation realistically and with little regard for the technical rules of criminal procedure. The
existence of pending prosecution has been determined on the basis of the total circumstances in each case.
45. To date, only one court has addressed this issue. In Modern Social Educ., Inc.
v. Preller, 353 F. Supp. 173, 180 (D. Md. 1973), Younger was held to bar
the granting of federal injunctive relief in a case such as the present one in
which criminal prosecution of the plaintiffs not only was expected and imminent at the time the federal action was filed but also was commenced within
a short time thereafter.
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threats of enforcement of a disputed criminal statute. Only the question of
issuing injunctions against threatened criminal proceedings remains unresolved. Assuming that the traditional hurdle of irreparable harm has been
removed, the jurisdictional question can be approached from the Younger re-

quirement of bad faith, from the Steffel precedent of ignoring comity and
federalism in the absence of prosecution, or simply from the doctrine of fed46
eral abstention.
Access to the courts is a critical first step for any constitutional litigant.
By refusing to extend the highly exclusive February Sextet doctrine, the Supreme Court decided a previously unresolved jurisdictional issue in favor of
greater judicial accessibility. The decision will be welcomed by those persons
who desire their day in court.
Ronald A. Johnston

LANDLORD-TENANT-Tenant Can Assert Seventh Amendment Right to Jury Trial in Eviction Proceeding. Pernell v.
Southall Realty, 94 S. Ct. 1723 (1974).
A pioneer in landlord-tenant litigation," the District of Columbia recently
provided the setting for yet another landmark decision in this area. In Per46. See Note, Implications of the Younger Cases for the Availability of Federal
Equitable Relief When No State Prosecutionis Pending, 72 COLuM. L. REV. 874 (1972).
The issues which have been discussed here are being litigated continuously, and the
path which has been traced by the Court in past decisions "may accurately be described
as sinuous." Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 479 (1974) (Rehnquist, J. & Burger,
C.J., concurring).
Since Steffel was rendered, the Second Circuit has discussed
the questions involved in federal intervention in Salem Inn v. Frank, No. 629 (2d Cir.
June 25, 1974), though that decision involved injunctive relief, which, as alluded to in
this Note, p. 149 supra, is widely viewed as a more drastic remedy than the declaratory
relief under consideration in Steffel. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82, 111 (1971)
(separate opinion of Brennan, J.).
1. See, e.g., Javins v. First National Realty Corp., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 925 (1970) (housing regulations imply a warranty of habitability in
leases); Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d 687 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1016
(1969) (landlord cannot evict in retaliation for tenant's reporting housing code violations
to authorities); Brown v. Southall'Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968) (basic validity of a housing contract depends upon landlord's substantial compliance with
the housing code at the beginning of the lease term).
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nell v. Southall Realty,2 the District's long history of court reorganization and
congressionally-mandated statutory revision served as an impetus for deciding
the delicate seventh amendment question of a tenant's right to jury trial in
a landlord's suit for repossession of real property for alleged non-payment
of rent.
In May 1971, petitioner David Pernell entered into a lease agreement
with Southall Realty for rental of a house in the District of Columbia. Three
months later, Southall filed a complaint in the Landlord and Tenant Branch
of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia, pursuant to D.C. Code
§ 16-1501,8 seeking to evict Pernell for alleged default on rent payment. Pernell filed an answer proposing a setoff for repairs he made during his tenancy
and a counterclaim for Southall's alleged failure to maintain the property in
compliance with the District's housing regulations. 4 Pernell also filed a
timely request for jury trial.
The trial judge sua sponte struck the jury demand, tried the case himself
after a one week continuance, and entered judgment for Southall. 5 On appeal, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals affirmed,0 asserting that under the seventh amendment Pernell was not entitled to a jury trial either in
defending his right to possession in the eviction action, or on the money damage claims he was seeking in the same proceedings.
The Supreme Court granted certiorari because of the unique nature of the
seventh amendment question and subsequently reversed the lower court's
holding. It noted that actions to recover land are generally actions at law
triable by a jury,7 and that this presumption is not dependent on the presence
2. 94 S. Ct. 1723 (1974).
3. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1501 (Supp. V, 1972) provides:
When a person detains possession of real property without right, or after his
right to possession has ceased, the Superior Court of the District of Columbia,
on complaint under oath verified by the person aggrieved by the detention, or
by his agent or attorney having knowledge of the facts, may issue a summons
to the party complained of to appear and show cause why judgment should not
be given against him for the restitution of possession.
4. D.C. case law allows several innovative defenses in landlord-tenant cases. See
cases cited note I supra. See also Robinson v. Diamond Housing Corp., 463 F.2d 853
(D.C. Cir. 1972), which involved a tenant who successfully asserted a retaliatory eviction defense in an eviction proceeding, but was subsequently served a thirty day notice
to quit by the landlord.
5. The only witness at trial was a representative of Southall, who testified that back
rent was owing. Pernell was not at the hearing, and the written evidence his counsel
sought to enter on the record was not accepted by the court because the papers were
allegedly not authenticated or presented by a witness who could be cross-examined. See
Pernell v. Southall Realty, 294 A.2d 490, 491 (D.C. Ct. App. 1972).
6. 294 A.2d at 490.
7. In Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146 (1891), the Court stated that, for seventh
amendment purposes, "where an action is simply for the recovery and possession of spe-
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or absence of title, as the appeals court contended. Although the distinction
between possession of, and title to, real property was one recognized at common law, the Court concluded that this did not affect a litigant's right to jury
trial."

In examining -thehistorical development of common law possessory actions,
Justice Marshall, writing for the majority, found the lower court's analysis
"fundamentally at odds with the test [the Supreme Court has] formulated
for resolving Seventh Amendment questions." 9 The appeals court, in trying
to find an exact common law analogue to D.C. Code § 16-1501, had placed
unjustified reliance on the form of similar actions, rather than on their substance. The valid seventh amendment test of whether a litigant has a right
to jury trial is not predicated on the existence of a common law procedure
which rigidly corresponds to a present-day form, but rather the existence of
similar rights and remedies.
I.

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY: AN ANALYSIS OF COMMON LAW
UNDERPINNINGS

10

Traditional seventh amendment analysis of the need for jury trial in an
action focuses on whether the claim sought to be litigated existed as a "legal"" claim triable by jury at common law.' 2 Southall's claim for repossession was statutory in nature, and therefore the right to jury trial depended
in great part on the availability of a jury trial under the closest historical anacific real or personal property, or for the recovery of a money judgment, the action is
one at law." Id. at 151.
8. See Grant Timber & Mfg. Co. v. Gray, 236 U.S. 133 (1915), which emphasized
the right to possession, rather than title, in an action of novel disseisin.
9. 94 S. Ct. at 1729. There were no dissenters from the majority opinion, though
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Douglas concurred only in the result.
10. A lengthy and scholarly analysis of § 16-1501's historical counterparts can be
found in Urciolo v. Evans, L & T No. 60495-71 (D.C. Super. Ct., Sept. 14, 1971), reported in part, 99 DAILY WASH. L. REP. 1729 (1971). Urciolo is similar in facts and
finding to Pernell.
11. The best indication of what is meant by "legal" is provided by Ross v. Bernhard,
The Court indicated that analysis of its cases shows the "legal"
396 U.S. 531 (1970).
nature of an issue to be determined by considering three factors: the analogous premerger custom, the remedy sought, and the abilities and limitations of juries. "Of these
factors," the Court noted, "the first, requiring extensive and possibly abstruse historical
inquiry, is obviously the most difficult to apply." Id. at 538 n.10.
12. Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970) and Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3 Pet.)
433 (1830), examined suits in which legal rights and remedies were distinguished from
equitable rights and remedies. See also Henderson, The Background of the Seventh
Amendment, 80 HARv. L. REv.289 (1966).
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logue to D.C. Code § 16-1501. Both the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court framed the issue in this manner.' 8
D.C. Code § 16-1501 provides, in brief, that one who retains possession
of another's real property without right may be summoned, on occasion of
the owner's complaint, by the Superior Court of the District of Columbia to
show cause why judgment should not be made against him. 14 Certainly some
analogous forms of action existed prior to 1791, when the seventh amendment was adopted. Summary eviction procedures for repossession of real
property were well-known in England, having been enacted to obviate landlords' frequent resort to self-help and to prevent breaches of the peace.' 5
An examination of relevant District of Columbia laws reveals that there
has always been some sort of statutory eviction proceeding since the Capital's
founding in 1800. Through the Organic Act of 1801, for example, Congress
adopted for the newly created District the common laws and statutes then
in force in Maryland.' 6 Among those statutes was one providing for "a summary mode of recovering the possession of lands and tenements," commenced
by complaint of a landlord and subject to trial by "twelve good and lawful
7
men" who were to decide if the landlord was entitled to possession.'
Proceedings under
a general revision of
novo appeal with the
trict of Columbia for

this Act continued until 1864,18 when Congress enacted
landlord-tenant law. 19 The revision provided for a de
right to jury trial before the Supreme Court of the Disthose tenants who did not wish to be tried before a jus-

0
tice of the peace alone. 2
13.

".

.

. whether this action or its equivalent existed at common law in England in

1791." 294 A.2d at 492. The term "common law" is used generally to mean that body
of law prevailing when the seventh amendment was adopted. See Baltimore and Carolina
Line, Inc. v. Redman, 295 U.S. 654 (1935); Slocum v. New York Life Ins. Co., 228
U.S. 364 (1913).
14. See note 3 supra.
15. See 4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 179.
16. Ch. 15, § 1, 2 Stat. 103. Of course, the unique aspect of congressional governance of the District of Columbia was continued. Congress maintained entire control
over the District for every purpose of government. See, e.g., Kendall v. United States,
37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838) (no division of power exists in the District between general and state governments); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821) (congressional acts in reference to the District are laws of the United States); Loughborough
v. Blake, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 317 (1820) (Congress has authority to impose a direct
tax on the District).
17. Act of Maryland of 1793, ch. XLIII, reprinted in 2 W. KILTY, LAWS OF MARYLAND (1800). The Act was entitled "An Act to provide a summary mode of recovering
the possession of lands and tenements holden by tenants for years, or at will, after the
expiration of their terms."
18. See, e.g., Lenox v. Arguelles, 15 F. Cas. 313 (No. 8244) (C.C.D.C. 1834).
19. Act of July 4, 1864, ch. 243, 13 Stat. 383.
20. Id. at 384. The Act provided, however, that if a defendant were to appeal, in
addition to other bail he must pay "all intervening damages to the leased property re-
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In 1899, the United States Supreme Court examined those trials which involved a justice of the peace rather than a judge in the case of Capitol Traction v. Hof.21 It concluded that such tribunals were not sufficient to satisfy
22
the meaning of a jury trial as contemplated under the seventh amendment.
Capitol Traction impelled further court restructuring intended to make the
seventh amendment's provisions fully applicable to the District of Columbia.
For example, the Justice of the Peace Court was made a full Court of Record
in the sense required by Capitol Traction, and a system of jury trials was
thus formally instituted. Further, section 3 of the new Act provided "that
hereafter when the value in controversy in any action pending in said Municipal Court shall exceed $20., and in all actions for the recovery of possession
of real property, either party may demand a trial by jury. .... -23
In 1970, Congress again substantially reorganized the District's court system with the District of Columbia Court Reform and Criminal Procedure
Act. 24 General original jurisdiction in eviction proceedings was transferred
from the old Court of General Sessions to the Superior Court of the District
25
of Columbia.
The most important aspect of this reorganization, in retrospect, is that the
right to jury trial in summary possessory actions, which formerly had been
assured by D.C. Code § 13-702'26 was eliminated. As both the court of appeals and the Supreme Court pointed out in Pernell, there exist different interpretations as to why Congress omitted this statutory provision. Some legislative history suggests that Congress considered the section "superfluous in
the light of constitutional jury trial requirements .... ,,27 On the other
hand, the original Senate version apparently considered it sufficiently important to retain the statutory guarantee "so as to assure the constitutionality of
the provisions regarding small claims."' 28
suiting from waste and intervening rent for the premises ..
21. 174 U.S. 1 (1899).

22. Id. at 18, 38. Such persons were determined to be in the nature of special commissioners or referees.
23. See H.R. REP. No. 472, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. (1919).
24. Pub. L. No. 91-358 (codified as pertinent here in D.C. CODE ANN. tit. 11
(1973)). See Symposium-The Modernization of Justice in the District of Columbia,
20 AM. U.L. REV. 7 (1971).
25. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-921 (Supp. V, 1972).
26. Act of March 3, 1921, ch. 125, 41 Stat. 1310.
27. H.R. REP. No. 907, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 164 (1970). The Committee invoked
constitutional requirements and cited P.L. 90-274 in further support of its view. The
law involves the policy of the United States that all litigants in federal courts who are
entitled to trial by jury shall have the right to grand and petit juries.
28. S. REP. No. 405, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 35 (1969). Some procedural provisions
regarding jury trial were repealed as inconsistent with the Uniform Interstate and Inter-
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THE COURT OF APPEALS APPROACH

Because Congress did not clearly state why it dropped the statutory provision for jury trial, 29 the historical basis of section 16-1501 became the focus
for both the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court.
The statute's mixed heritage, however, did not provide forceful guidance in
the debate regarding its progenitors. If Southall's claim were to be traced, as

Southall argued, to common law forcible entry and detainer statutes of Henry
VI's time, s0 then section 16-1501's common law analogue was an action tried
not by jury, but before special commissioners or referees, which under
Capitol Traction is not to be regarded as tantamount to the traditional jury
trial. If, on the other hand, the claim were to be traced to the classic common law possessory actions of ejectment, novel disseisin, or writs of entry," 1
an historical analysis would prove such claim to be triable by jury, since these
were actions for which there was a right to jury trial.
By basing its analysis on the former approach, the court of appeals felt
justified in denying Pernell's request. Rejecting the assertion that the closest
historical analogue was an action of ejectment, -the court reasoned that the
District of Columbia Code currently contains another, separate section re-

garding ejectment, 32 and that the question of title is normally present in an
ejectment action.

33

Moreover, the court emphasized that the type of trial used in the District's

summary possession proceedings -in the 1800's involved a justice of the peace
rather than a judge. Since Capitol Traction seemingly held that such a tribunal was not sufficient to satisfy the meaning of a jury trial within the sense
of the seventh amendment, the court concluded that the action provided for
in section 16-1501 was not one triable by jury at common law and thus did
national Procedure Act and unnecessary in light of another proposed chapter. However,
the provision for a right to jury trial in cases where the amount in controversy exceeds
$20 and in real property actions was retained.
29. Nor do the rules of the District of Columbia courts offer guidance for someone
in Pernell's situation. For example, Landlord and Tenant Rule 6 provides that "any
party entitled to a jury trial may demand a trial by jury of any action brought in
this branch." And Superior Court Civil Rule 38(a) provides that "[tihe right of trial
by jury as declared by the seventh amendment to the Constitution or as given by an
applicable statute shall be preserved to the parties inviolate."
30. See 8 Hen. 6, c. 9 (1429), a forcible entry and detainer statute under which actions were tried before a justice of the peace with no right of appeal.
31. See generally 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 47-52
(2d ed. 1898).
32. D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-1124 (1973) provides that, in a situation where a tenant's
rent is more than one-half year in arrears, a landlord has the right by law to reenter
and may, without any formal demand or reentry, commence a civil action in ejectment.
33. See D.C. SUPER. CT. LL. & TEN. R. 5(c).
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not require a jury unless mandated by statute. The court read Block v.
Hirsh,14 which upheld the constitutionality of a statute that transferred a
landlord's action to recover possession from a trial court to a rent control commission, to bolster this conclusion.
Additional support for the court's denial of jury trial was derived from its
reading of Lindsey v. Normet.3 5 A recent Supreme Court case which
checked slightly the rapid evolution of modern landlord-tenant law,3 6 Lindsey
upheld the constitutionality of an Oregon forcible entry and detainer statute
which provides that after service of summons a tenant has no more than six
days to take a contested claim to court unless he provides security for accruing rent.
Lindsey's holding was narrow, but it had significant impact on other jurisdictions, as witnessed by the court of appeals' contention that the decision
proved that a jurisdiction may validly "single out possessory disputes between
landlord and tenant for especially prompt judicial settlement without violating
equal protection."'T Under this reading, the expedited character of such proceedings could, presumably, obviate a requirement for jury trial where it was
not constitutionally mandated. The court's analysis thus came full circle to
the major focus, an historical analysis of D.C. Code § 16-1501 in view of
the seventh amendment.
III.

A

MEANINGLESS BATTLE OF FORMS YIELDS TO
CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS

It can be contended that searching for an exact common law analogue to
section 16-1501 is a process both misleading and anathema to a forwardlooking judiciary. The seventh amendment was not intended to bind the
country's judicial system to the forms of action belonging to another era. As
the Supreme Court recently stated in Ross v. Bernhard,3 s the seventh amendment question turns on the nature of the issue to be tried rather than the
character of the overall action.3 9
34. 256 U.S. 135 (1921). The date of this suit is noteworthy. A sudden influx of
people to the District of Columbia caused by the war and increased governmental needs
played a large part in the Court's decision that the suspension of ordinary remedies was
a reasonable provision of a statute in view of its aim and intent.
35. 405 U.S. 56 (1972).
36. Itparticularly slowed the trend toward recognition of an implied warranty of habitability inleases. See note 1 supra.
37. 294 A.2d at 493.
38. 396 U.S. 531 (1970).
39. This view finds support in a much earlier case, Parsons v. Bedford, 28 U.S. (3
Pet.) 433 (1830): "By common law [the framers] meant . . . -not merely suits, which
the common law recognized among itsold and settled proceedings, but suits in which
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Certainly, some guidance can be gleaned from an analysis of a claim's
closest historical statutory analogue, but it is the correlative right or remedy
at common law that is truly determinative of whether the seventh amendment
requires a jury to hear that claim. Guided by this principle, the Supreme
Court in Pernell pointedly commented that the seventh amendment requires
jury trial in actions which may have been unheard of at common law, as long
as the action involves rights and remedies of the sort traditionally enforced
in an action at law. 40 Actions to recover land, it continued, have long been
41
regarded as actions at law triable by jury.
The Court went on to admit that the broad language of Capitol Traction
v. Hof might be interpreted as proposing that a trial before a justice of the
peace was totally unknown at common law.42 It asserted, nonetheless, that
such a reaing, as applied to Pernell's case, is mistaken. Rather, the Court
emphasized that in England a common law trial before a justice of the peace
represented a jury trial in the full constitutional sense, 43 and was thus distinguishable from the trial before a justice of the peace in Capitol Traction.
Similarly, the Court rejected the District of Columbia Court of Appeals'
contention that, in an action for the recovery of real property, the distinction
between title to and possession of the property is sufficient to deny or award
jury trial. Though it may have been a distinction recognized at common law,
the Court was of the opinion that it has no bearing currently on the right
to jury trial.
Finally, following a deeply embedded judicial principle that the Constitution recognizes higher values than procedural expediency, the Court totally
rejected the lower court's reliance on the possibility that affording tenants the
right to jury trial would place an unmanageable burden on the expeditious
handling of landlord-tenant cases.
The lower court's reading of Block v. Hirsh to support such a contention
was clearly incorrect for, according to the Supreme Court, Block merely
stands for the principle that the seventh amendment is generally inapplicable
legal rights were to be ascertained and determined . . . whatever may be the peculiar
" Id. at 447 (emphasis supplied).
40. 94 S. Ct. at 1729.
41. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531 (1970); Scott v. Neely, 140 U.S. 106 (1891);
Whitehead v. Shattuck, 138 U.S. 146 (1891).
42. 94 S.Ct. at 1732.
43. English justices of the peace were required to be learned in the law. They

form which they may assume ....

were judges of record and their courts, courts of record. The procedures they
followed differed in no essential manner from that of the high court of assize
-held by the King's judges.- Trial by jury before the justices of the peace pro-

ceeded in the usual manner of a criminal trial by jury in the King's court.
94 S. Ct. at 1732.
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in administrative proceedings where jury trials would be incompatible with the
whole concept of administrative adjudication. 44 Nor does Lindsey v. Normet
support the notion that there is some inherent inconsistency between the need
for summary possession actions and the right to jury trial. The Court noted
that the forcible entry and detainer statute involved in Lindsey itself guaranteed a right to jury trial.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Placing a statute in its historic framework can be a useful analytical tool
when, as in the Supreme Court's decision in Pernell, the analysis goes to the
substance rather than the form of the statutory claim. Courts must be wary,
however, of attempts to rigidly define a correlation between modern statutes
which have evolved to meet the needs of justice in a modem judicial system,
with earlier forms of action that were responsive to different values and circumstances. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals in Pernell erred in
this respect.
By extracting absolute, and occasionally obscure, facets of D.C. Code §
16-1501 (such as its provision for expeditious proceeding and the fact that
its nineteenth-century counterpart utilized justices of the peace rather than
judges), the court of appeals constructed a series of false analogies. It reasoned, for example, that providing for jury trial in the disposition of summary
possessory actions might place an unmanageable burden on the court system.
Yet, prior to 1970, jury trial in such proceedings had been recognized by statute for nearly a century, and no such burden had developed.
The criticism that affording the right to jury trial in summary repossession
proceedings will create a backlog in the courts is nevertheless likely to remain
a point of major contention among critics of Pernell. But, logically extended,
this argument goes too far by implying that the very existence of the seventh
amendment right to jury trial is somehow inversely proportional to the volume
of landlord-tenant litigation in the District of Columbia at any given time.
Certainly, seventh amendment rights cannot be weighed in such a fashion.
So fundamental a right that it "should be jealously guarded by the
courts, ' 45 the right to jury trial should neither fall victim to subjective logic
nor be qualified in the name of expediency. The Supreme Court's treatment
of Pernell demonstrated that it is substantive common law rights, not the transient forms relative to a claim, that emerge as the valid touchstones in a con44. Id. at 1733.
45. Jacob v. City of New York, 315 U.S. 752, 753 (1942).
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stitutional analysis of the right to jury trial. The Court's approach goes a
long way toward guaranteeing that reasoned judicial analysis will continue
to complement the evolution of landlord-tenant law.
Carole Mattessich

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Neither the Eleventh Amendment
nor the Doctrine of Executive Immunity Automatically Bar a
Suit for Damages Brought against State Officials in their Individual Capacities under 42 U.S.C. § 1983-Scheuer v. Rhodes,
94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974).
The fourteenth amendment provides that no state can deprive a person of
-his rights to due process and equal protection.' The eleventh amendment
says that no state can be sued in a federal court. 2 An aggrieved plaintiff
can attempt to circumvent the eleventh amendment bar by bringing a federal
cause of action against a state officer rather than the state itself. But even
if he is able to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court, he may then be
faced with overcoming the obstacle of a state official's assertion of immunity
from suit.

Recently, in Scheuer v. Rhodes,8 the Supreme Court reviewed the effects
of the eleventh amendment and common law immunities in an action brought
4
against Ohio officials under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act of 187 1.
1. The amendment reads in part: ". . . nor shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within
its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2. "The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any
suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."

U.S. CONST.

amend. XI. By its own terms the amendment bars suit against one state by citizens
of another state, and it has been construed to bar suits against a state by its own citizens.
Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890); In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887).
3. 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974).
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) (originally enacted as § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of
April 20, 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13). The full section reads:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom,
or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
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In a unanimous opinion5 the Court found that neither the eleventh amendment nor the common law doctrines of executive immunity bar a suit for
damages.
Personal representatives of three students killed in the May 1970 civil disorders on the campus of Kent State University in Ohio brought their action
initially under both section 1983 and the wrongful death statutes of Ohio.6
Petitioners asserted that state officials of the executive branch 7 did intentionally, recklessly, willfully and wantonly bring about the deaths of the three
students. Petitioners sought $11,000,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 8 The district court dismissed the complaints on the pleadings, without
receiving any evidence, on the grounds that in substance and effect the claims
were being made against the State of Ohio, and thus were barred by the
eleventh amendment.9 The court dismissed on the alternative ground that
the common law doctrine of executive immunity was absolute, also barring
the actions.
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed, 10 one judge dissenting,
stating that the district court properly dismissed the complaints on the pleadings since "it]he Civil Rights Act, § 1983, cannot be engrafted on the
Eleventh Amendment by judicial construction."'" The circuit court applied
5. Mr. Justice Douglas took no part in the decision.
6. The pertinent provision of the Ohio statutes relating to the state militia reads:
When a member of the organized militia is ordered to duty by state authority
during a time of public danger, he is not answerable in a civil suit for any
act performed within the scope of his military duties at the scene of any disorder within said designated area unless the act is one of willful or wanton
misconduct.
OHio REv. CODE ANN. § 5923.37 (Supp. 1973). The federal district court will, on remand, take jurisdiction of the wrongful death claims under diversity rules in two complaints and under pendent jurisdiction in one.
7. Defendants included the former Governor of Ohio (Rhodes), the adjutant general
and his assistant, named and unnamed officers of the Ohio National Guard, and the
president of Kent State University.
8. The complaints alleged that Governor Rhodes unnecessarily ordered troops to
Kent State; authorized the troops to carry loaded weapons, but failed to give definitive
orders regarding the circumstances under which the firing of the weapons would be authorized; and authorized indiscriminate action against persons assembled on the campus,
regardless of whether or not such assembly was lawful. The complaints alleged further
that the inadequate training of the officers and troops of the Guard increased the risk
of harm to the university students, and that university president White took no action
to alleviate this situation. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 449-50 (6th Cir. 1972),
rev'd sub nom. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974).
9. Dismissal was for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)
(1).
10. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430 (6th Cir. 1972).
11. Id. at 443.
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the doctrine of sovereign immunity under Ohio law to the state's "agencies
and instrumentalities, ' 12 and emphasized that where sovereign immunity
exists "it cannot be defeated by allegations that the defendant acted maliciously.' u 3 The circuit court further held that executive immunity was also
a bar to relief, since it "would not be conducive to good government to require the Chief Executive of either the nation or the state to defend himself
in court. . . because he called out troops to suppress riots or disorders which
4
resulted in injury."'
The Supreme Court held that the district court improperly dismissed the
complaints and thereby precluded any opportunity for the representatives of
the decedents to prove their claims.' 5 The Court focused on both the eleventh amendment and the executive immunity issues as framed by the circuit
court, and reversed and remanded the case for review on the merits. This
Note will explore the issues posed by eleventh amendment sovereign immunity and common law executive immunity, as presented in Scheuer, and as
applied to prior suits brought under section 1983.16
I.

THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT

The Supreme Court has never squarely resolved the apparent conflict be12. Id. at 439.
13. Id. at 442.
14. Id. at 437. No additional authority was cited for extending absolute immunity
to the Governor.
Under Ohio law the Governor can use the state militia to "suppress or prevent riot
or insurrection," OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 5923.21 (1954) and can call on the Guard
in instances of "tumult, riot, mob, or body of men acting together to commit a felony, or
to do or offer violence to person or property, or by force and violence break or resist
the laws of the state . . . ." OfHo REV. CODE ANN. § 5923.22 (Supp. 1973). Members
of the state militia are immune from civil suit for any act performed within the scope
of their military duties unless the conduct was willful or wanton. See note 6 supra.
15. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 94 S. Ct. 1683 (1974). It seems clear that the district court's
refusal to accept as true the allegations of the complaints is contrary to a large body
of law. See, e.g., Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651 (1951); Ickes v. Fox, 300 U.S.
82 (1937); Ickes v. Virginia Colorado Dev. Corp., 295 U.S. 639 (1935).
The
defendants did not answer but merely attached to the motions to dismiss two proclamations of Governor Rhodes, each calling on the militia, as proof of insurrection and violence. From these proclamations, and by taking judicial notice of the events surrounding the Kent State tragedy, the district court found no cause of action under section 1983
or the wrongful death statutes of Ohio. 471 F.2d at 432-33, construed in 94 S. Ct. at
1693.
16. Other noteworthy civil suits arising from the Kent State disorders include Gilligan v. Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973) (United States Supreme Court held that the political
question doctrine precluded a judicial remedy to control the manner in which troops
were trained, armed and ordered in emergencies); Krause v. State, 31 Ohio St. 2d 132,
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tween the jurisdictional bar of the eleventh amendment and the right to a
private action against a state under the fourteenth.' 7 However, the Court
has recognized since Ex parte Young' s that a state officer sued in an equity
proceeding cannot invoke what is considered only the state's right to eleventh
amendment immunity. The eleventh amendment reflects the common law
doctrine of sovereign immunity and operates in that context as a purely jurisdictional matter. 19 When a state official is the defendant, however, the
amendment operates not as an automatic procedural bar but in a substantive
context, requiring an analysis of the relief being sought and a focus on
whether, and how, the nature of that relief legally affects the official's assertion of personal immunity.
What is clear from past decisions is that the eleventh amendment will operate as a bar when the state is a named party of record, or when it is an
"indispensable party" or holds a "real party interest" in the outcome of a suit.
Chief Justice Marshall stated for the Court in Osborn v. Bank of the United

States20 that the state was not an indispensable party to a suit in equity which
sought to compel the state auditor to return illegally seized federal funds. 2'
The auditor could be sued individually, notwithstanding the eleventh amendment. 22 The "indispensable party" test evolved somewhat into a "real party
in interest" test in the half century after Osborn,2 3 and today both tests are
285 N.E.2d 736, appeal dismissed, 409 U.S. 1052 (1972) (Ohio Supreme Court held local courts are without jurisdiction to hear suits of this nature against the state).
17. Although states are immune from suits in federal courts brought by private citizens, they are not immune from actions brought by the United States or by another state.
See, e.g., Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934); Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1
(1890).
18. 209 U.S. 123 (1908). Stockholders of a railroad sought to enjoin the attorney
general of Minnesota from enforcing state legislation involving rate schemes and penalties which the stockholders claimed were violative of both due process and equal protection. The attorney general claimed that the suit was "in truth and effect . . . against
the State of Minnesota." Id. at 132.
Action by state officers, whether within their scope of authority or not, is considered
as sufficient "state action" to invoke the due process and equal protection clauses of the
fourteenth amendment. See, e.g., Ex parte Young, supra; Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380
U.S. 479 (1965).
19. The concept of sovereign immunity stems from English law under which the King
had absolute personal immunity from suit in his courts. See McCormack, Intergovernmental Immunity and the Eleventh Amendment, 51 N.C.L. REV. 485, 502-03 (1973).
20. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 738 (1824).
21. Ohio had levied a tax on a local branch of the federally operated bank, similar
to the situation reviewed in the landmark case McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4
Wheat.) 316 (1819). Osborn, the state auditor, seized bank funds in satisfaction of the
taxes allegedly owed the state. The bank sued Osborn for immediate return of the tax
and to enjoin Osborn from future attempts at seizure.
22. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 846-59.
23. See In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270
(1884).
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functionally combined under federal procedural rules. 2 4 A state is considered indispensable or as having a real party interest when the suit is brought
against state officials who hold no personal interest in the subject matter of
the suit. Essentially, when satisfaction for the judgment would come from
the state treasury,2 5 or when the suit is seeking to compel the state to act
or refrain from acting, such as an action for specific performance of a contract, 20 the eleventh amendment will operate as a bar.
There was no such state interest operating in Scheuer. The Ohio executive
officials were being sued as individuals for tortious conduot, 27 and the relief
sought would have had no effect on the state's finances or activities. Chief
Justice Burger, writing for the Court in Scheuer, relied on the doctrine of Ex
parte Young in saying that "the Eleventh Amendment provides no shield for
a state official confronted by a claim that he deprived another of a federal
right under the color of state law."' 2 8 An action for monetary damages rather
than for injunctive relief as was sought in Ex parte Young is, in some circumstances, a permissible remedy and "can be as effective a redress for the infringement of a constitutional right [in one instance] as injunctive relief might
'29
be in another.
The Scheuer Court thus made it clear that the eleventh amendment has
no direct impact on the availability of money damages from state officers or
any bearing on suits where the state is neither named nor indispensably involved. 3 0
II.

IMMUNITIES AND SECTION

1983

Once a private claimant clears the jurisdictional and "indispensable party"
barriers embodied in the eleventh amendment, the doctrines of personal im24. See FED. R. Civ. P. 19(a).

25. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Indiana Dep't of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459 (1945);
Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490 (1921).
26. See In re Ayers, 123 U.S. 443 (1887); Hagood v. Southern, 117 U.S. 52 (1886).

27.
state's
28.
29.

Recovery for intentional torts committed by state officers does not require the
presence as a party. Poindexter v. Greenhow, 114 U.S. 270, 292-98 (1884).
94 S. Ct. at 1687.
Id. The Court cites for this proposition Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S.

693 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Myers v. Anderson, 238 U.S. 368
(1915).
In Stringer v. Dilger, 313 F.2d 536 (10th Cir. 1963), a private person sued

highway patrolmen for using excessive force in an arrest. The court allowed compensatory damages on the common law counts and punitive damages on the civil rights count.
See also Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74 (3d Cir. 1965), wherein punitive damages were
allowed under section 1983 without allowing any actual damages on common law counts.
30. Presumably, the same reasons dictate that Ohio wrongful death actions are also
not suits against the state and thus are not barred by the eleventh amendment. That

does not mean that Ohio's immunity laws will not operate, however.

See note 43 infra.

1974]

Casenotes

munity introduce further obstacles to recovery. Members of Congress hold
a constitutionally-based absolute immunity with respect to their activities
while Congress is in session.A' For reasons parallel to those which underlie
legislative immunity, the judiciary has historically enjoyed absolute immunity
in damage actions as derived from the common law, 32 but may be subject
to equitable claims.33 Immunity for executive officials, however, has generally not been recognized to the same degree. Prosecutors, like judges, have
been found subject to equitable claims, but nevertheless have enjoyed immunity from suits seeking damages.8 4 Policemen, on the other hand, hold
a somewhat more qualified immunity, and can be subject to damage claims. 85
The validity of extending executive immunity to state officers being sued for
damages under section 1983 is less than clear, and thus requires a look at
both the statute itself and the common law development of the executive immunity doctrine. 6
On its face, section 1983 appears inconsistent with the doctrine of executive immunity.8 7 Every person who acts under color of state law is subject
to a suit brought for injunction or damages.38 Some courts have interpreted
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. See also Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
32. See, e.g., Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 349 (1871).
33. See, e.g., Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389 (7th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other
grounds sub nom. O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1973).
34. See, e.g., Madison v. Gernstein, 440 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1971); Fanale v. Sheehy,
385 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1967).
35. Policemen have been granted an immunity under the common law to actions of
false arrest and imprisonment. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 555-57 (1967); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF TORTS § 121 (1965); p. 170 infra. For a relatively brief,
but good review of the various common law doctrines of personal immunity, see McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial Enforcement of Constitutional Protections, Part1, 60 VA. L. REV. 1, 10-17 (1974).
36. A different question, not posed in Scheuer, is whether these plaintiffs are entitled
to a trial by jury. The statute does not specify the types of relief available, which under
the seventh amendment is the primary determinant of whether or not the right to a jury
trial arises. Actions for money damages are usually considered legal in nature and thus
fall within the purview of the seventh amendment. See Ross v. Bernhard, 396 U.S. 531
(1970); Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood, 369 U.S. 469 (1962); Beacon Theatres, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500 (1959). But see Lawton v. Nightingale, 345 F. Supp. 683
(N.D. Ohio 1972), where the court held there was no right to a jury trial under section
1983 since the action could not have been brought at common law. See generally
8 HARV. Civ. RIGHTS-Civ. LiB. L. REV. 613 (1973).
37. See note 4 supra.
38. To bring a suit under section 1983, plaintiff must first establish that the official
infringed upon a federal right and that the official's conduct was sufficiently under color
of state law. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970); Hague v. CIO, 101
F.2d 774 (3d Cir. 1939). An officer who acts contrary to his duty as defined by state
law may nevertheless be acting under color of that law. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
172 (1961). Such an act, even if unlawful, is sufficient state action to invoke a remedy
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the legislative history of the 1871 Act as eliminating the granting of any immunities, including those accorded by the common law to members of the

40
judiciary and legislature.3 9 Nevertheless, the immunities have survived,
and the Supreme Court has expressly recognized them as a bar to suits against
judges and legislators brought under section 1983. 4 1 The immunity accorded
executive officials, however, has never been firmly established, although the
circuit courts have for the most part rejected claims of absolute immunity by
42
state executives sued on constitutional grounds.
. Immunity for executive and administrative officials has been generally
recognized as "qualified," something less than absolute and highly dependent
on the facts from which the suit evolved. 43 In Pierson v. Ray, 44 a suit was

under the fourteenth amendment. See note 18 supra.
"Person," under section 1983, does not include municipalities, City of Kenosha v.
Bruno, 412 U.S. 507 (1973); or counties, Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693
(1973). But see Griffin v. Prince Edward County School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964).
39. See, e.g., Picking v. Pennsylvania R.R., 151 F.2d 240 (3d Cir. 1945). Cf. Littleton v. Berbling, 468 F.2d 389, 405 (7th Cir. 1972). The Second Circuit, in a case in
which it recognized certain legislative and judicial immunity, nevertheless observed that
section 1983 is "cast in terms so broad as to suggest that suits brought under [that section's] common law doctrines of immunity can never be a bar." Jobson v. Henne, 355
F.2d 129, 133 (2d Cir. 1966).
The dissenting judge in the lower court noted that the doctrine of executive immunity
was not recognized here or in England until some twenty years after the enactment of
section 1983, and therefore, it was very doubtful that Congress intended the doctrine
to apply. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 454 (6th Cir. 1972), citing Barr v. Matteo,
360 U.S. 564, 581-82 (1959) (Warren, C.J., dissenting). See also Spalding v. Vilas,
161 U.S. 483 (1896); 2 F. HARPER & F. JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS 1632-33 (1956).
40. See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967). See generally Kates & Kouba,
Liability of Public Entities Under Section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act, 45 S. CAL. L.
REV. 131 (1972); Note, Liability of Judicial Officers Under Section 1983, 79 YALE
L.J. 322 (1969).
41. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951).
42. See, e.g., Jones v. Perrigan, 459 F.2d 81 (6th Cir. 1972); Carter v. Carlson, 447
F.2d 358, 365 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S. 418 (1973); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Jobson v. Henne, 355 F.2d 129 (2d
Cir. 1966).
43. Absolute immunity has been extended to certain executives of high rank at least
in one frequently cited defamation case, Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959). Defamation is a tort and does not in most circumstances reflect a constitutional deprivation.
Although an absolute privilege may be permitted for tortious conduct alone, once a state
officer violates civil rights he may no longer be entitled to the privilege. Sostre v.
McGinnis, 442 F.2d 178 (2d Cir. 1971).
It is clear that some courts will view certain common law torts as infringements upon
constitutional rights. See, e.g., Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1969) (false imprisonment); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965) (false arrest); Hardwick v. Hurley, 289 F.2d 529 (7th Cir. 1961) (assault and battery).
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961), ad-
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brought against policemen under section 1983 and common law counts of
false arrest and imprisonment. Plaintiffs had been arrested for entering a
racially segregated room. After their convictions were reversed they sought
damages from the arresting officers. The Court allowed the officers to assert
common law defenses of good faith and probable cause to the section 1983
claim as well as to the tort causes of action. 45 The rationale of the defense,
often termed a "qualified immunity," was that policemen acting within the
scope of their duties should not be held personally accountable in damage
claims for a reasonable, honest mistake. 46 In allowing the assertion of this
defense, the Pierson Court required the defendants to undertake the burden
of proving that they acted in good faith in order to sustain their claims of
47
executive immunity.
In Moyer v. Peabody,48 however, the Court did not look to the defendants'
evidence of good faith in upholding a district court's dismissal of a 1983 claim
against the Governor of Colorado and the heads of the state militia. In
Moyer, plaintiff was a leader of a union whose members were rioting. He
was arrested by an officer of the National Guard and imprisoned for over
two months without charges being filed. The dismissal was found appropriate because the alleged false arrest and imprisonment occurred during a
time of "insurrection," when deterrence of the activity engaged in by Moyer's
constituents seemed necessary. 49 Although the Court did not grant the Governor absolute immunity, it did note that plaintiff had not alleged that the
state executives had acted in bad faith. 50 Consequently, there was no need
vocated a "federal" immunity rule by virtue of which state rules could not destroy actions under section 1983. Id. at 183. See also Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312, 314 (6th
Cir. 1958). The argument for a "federal" rule gains support from the view that Congress chose, through section 1983, to make the federal judiciary the primary guardian
against state interference with constitutional rights. See Perez v. Ledesma, 401 U.S. 82,
106-07 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). Cf. Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 410-11 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
Immunity from wrongful death actions is based in Ohio law, however. Cf. Roberts
v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819, 830 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971); Carter
v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358, 361-65 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 409 U.S.
418 (1973).
44. 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
45. Id. at 556-57.
46. It has been suggested, however, that policemen should be liable for the natural
consequences of their acts. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
47. The "good faith" test appears to be an acceptable one to the circuit courts. See,
e.g., Fluker v. Alabama Bd. of Educ., 441 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1971); McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968); Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1958).
48. 212 U.S. 78 (1909).
49. Id. at 85.
50. Id. The dissenting judge in Krause v. Rhodes.argues that the rule in Moyer v.
Peabody should also be limited to times of "actual insurrection," which were not neces-
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to receive evidence since the Governor's reason for calling on the Guard had
not been put into issue.
The scope of the Moyer ruling became more clear in Sterling v. Constantin,51 where a suit was brought to enjoin the Governor of Texas and generals
of the National Guard from restricting the production of oil from plaintiff's
wells. The Supreme Court upheld the district court's decision to take evidence in order to determine the extent to which executive immunity could
be invoked. The plaintiff had in his pleadings expressly placed in issue the
propriety of the Governor's resort to force.5 2
From Moyer and Sterling it was clear that plaintiffs had to allege an absence of good faith on the part of the defendant state officials if plaintiffs
were to surmount assertions of immunity at the pleading stage. Pierson applied the common law defense of good faith to actions under section 1983.
These cases, however, were viewed under the theory that the officers were
acting within the scope of their authority, even if in derogation of it.
A wholly different issue arises when the state officer is clearly acting outside the scope of his authority. This issue was put squarely before the Court
in Monroe v. Pape.53 InMonroe, police officers broke into a home, searched
and arrested plaintiffs, physically beat them and put them under rigorous interrogation, all without warrant or probable cause. Plaintiffs brought an action under section 1983. The Court found the policemen's tortious conduct to
be a total misuse of power, made possible because the "wrongdoer is clothed
with the authority of state law."' 54 The standard to be derived from Monroe
appears to be that a state official acting outside his authority can be held
accountable if he could reasonably have foreseen the unconstitutionality of
his actions. An action taken in good faith alone is not necessarily a constitutional one. 55
In Scheuer, the Court briefly explored areas of the Moyer, Sterling and
Monroe decisions, along with other cases,5 6 and relied heavily on the rationale
of Pierson in extending only a "qualified" immunity to the Ohio Governor
sarily present at Kent State, but were admitted by plaintiff Moyer in his suit. 471 F.2d
at 459 (Celebrezze, J.,
dissenting).
51. 287 U.S. 378 (1932).
52. The district court had made findings of fact that no tumult or insurrection existed. Id. at 390-91.
53. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
54. Id. at 184, quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 327 n.10 (1941). Thus,
there was sufficient color of state law to bring an action under section 1983. See also
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 112 (1945).
55. 365 U.S. at 187.
56. Barr v. Matteo, 360 U.S. 564 (1959); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951); Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896).
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and other defendants. 57 The petitioners had in their pleadings expressly
placed in issue whether the defendants had acted within the scope of their
authority, and if so, whether they had acted in good faith. 5s Consequently,
petitioners were entitled to present evidence on these issues.5 9 The Court
declined to explicitly define the scope of immunity to which Ohio executives
'might be entitled, and limited its consideration to the question of whether the
immunity was absolute. The Scheuer Court clearly announced that absolute
immunity may never exist at the outset of a case; a plaintiff must be given
the opportunity to be heard on the merits. As Chief Justice Burger wrote
in Scheuer, "There was no opportunity afforded petitioners to contest the
facts assumed [by the district court] in [its] conclusion. There was no evidence before the Court from which such a finding of good faith could be
properly made .

. . ."60

Thus, the scope of immunity which the defendant

executives could invoke was necessarily related to facts not yet established.
Those facts, when established, would yield further insight into the availability
of the immunity protection. The state officer operating in a situation calling
for discretion can assert a good faith defense, but a good faith defense cannot
be asserted to justify clearly unconstitutional conduct.
III. CONCLUSION

The decision in Scheuer v. Rhodes is narrow but not insignificant. Scheuer
has, in undeniable terms, upheld the basic doctrines of Ex parte Young and
clearly recognized the existence of a private federal cause of action against
state officials, notwithstanding the eleventh amendment. In establishing that
a state executive's immunity is not absolute, Scheuer promises that section
1983 will not be wholly circumscribed by common law privileges. As the
57. 94 S. Ct. at 1693 (1974).
58. Id. Under Ohio law there is a distinction between, and a different approach to,
immunity under "discretionary" and "ministerial" tests. If the officer's act was a ministerial one, he is subject to individual liability for negligence. If his act was a discretionary one within the scope of his authority, he is not liable absent bad faith or corrupt
motive. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 465-66 (6th Cir. 1972). Negligence in a ministerial function would not protect an official from section 1983 liability. See Carter
v. Carlson, 447 F.2d 358 (D.C. Cir. 1971), wherein Judge Bazelon stated that the substantive law of torts should be enough protection for officials who act reasonably under
the circumstances, and that when the act is of a discretionary nature then the discretion
required should be raised not as an immunity issue but as an issue relating to ultimate
liability. Id. at 364 n.15.
59. It follows, too, that evidence has to be taken in the Ohio wrongful death actions,
since the complaints allege "willful and wanton" misconduct, a condition precedent to
standing to sue under Ohio law. See note 6 supra. The Court made it very clear, however, that summary judgment could be granted. 94 S. Ct. at 1693.
60. 94 S. Ct. at 1693.
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dissenting judge in the Sixth Circuit stated: "The burden upon state officials
to defend against these suits----the nonmeritorious as well as the meritoriousis but a small price to pay for the protection of constitutional rights."' ' What
remains to be resolved, however, is what standards the trial court should follow in determining the scope of an executive's immunity once the issue is
properly placed before the court.
Bruce E. Parmley

61. Krause v. Rhodes, 471 F.2d 430, 458 (6th Cir. 1972) (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).

